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Executive Summary
Merger policy is the most active area of U.S. antitrustpolicy. It is now widely
believed that merger policy must move beyond itstraditional focus on static ef-
ficiency to account for innovation and address dynamicefficiency. Innovation
cart fundamentally affect merger analysis in two ways. First, innovationcan
dramatically affect the relationship between thepre-merger marketplace and
what is likely to happen if a proposedmerger is consummated. Thus, irinova-
tion can fundamentally influence the appropriate analysis foraddressing tradi-
tional, static efficiency concerns. Second, innovationcan itself be an important
dimension of market performance that is potentially affectedby a merger. We
explore how merger policy is meeting the challenges posedby innovation.
I.Introduction
Merger policy is the most activearea of U.S. antitrust policy. From
1991 to 2002, for example, the Antitrust Divisionof the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice conducted an average of 161merger investigations
each year, which is more than all of the division'sother civil and crimi-
nal investigations combined.' Merger investigationsconstitute a simi-
larly important part of the Federal TradeCommission's Maintaining
Competition Mission.2
Traditionally, merger policy focusedon the question of whether a
proposed transaction would lead to higheror lower prices, based on a
static analysis that compared marketpower and efficiency effects. Dy-
namic considerations such as research and development(R&D), while
not altogether absent, played relatively little role.3 Today,Innovation
is widely recognized as an important driver ofnational economic
welfare. Productivity growth driven by technologicalchange has
been credited with stimulating themajor economic expansions of the1960s, 1980s, and 1990s.4 Although preciseestimates of the particular
percentages of economic output orgrowth that can be attributed to
innovation are hard to make, policy makersand economists agree
strongly that innovation is a critical componentof a sustained, healthy
economy.
The consensus about the value of innovationhas spread to antitrust
policy. It is now well recognized by antitrustenforcement officials
that investment in research and thediffusion of innovations are among
the most important dimensions ofmarket performance. One official
observed that "the more important that innovationbecomes to society,
the more important it is to preserve economicincentives to innovate,"5
and another observed that, "as important asprice competition is to us,
a second major andpossibly even greater concern is maintaining com-
petition for innovation."6 Merger policy hasthus increasingly focused
on innovation, althoughexactly what the new focus in merger policy
means or how it translatesinto enforcement has proven difficult to
ascertain.
In this paper, we examine the developingrole of innovation in U.S.
merger policy. Considerationsof innovation are central to merger poi-
icy in at least two ways. First, becausedynamic efficiency is critical to
successful economic performance, the effectsof a merger on innovation
can generate considerable interest.In other words, innovation can itself
be an important dimension of marketperformance that is potentially affected
by a merger. Merging parties frequently assertthat the transaction will
allow them to engage in greater innovation,while antitrust enforcers
may object to a transaction onthe grounds that it will lead to a lossof
competition that would otherwise spurinnovation. To assess fully the
impact of a merger on market performance, mergerauthorities and
courts must examine how aproposed transaction changes market par-
ticipants' incentives and abifities to undertakeinvestments in innova-
tion. We will refer to this first rolefor innovation in merger policy as
the innovation incentives criterion.
A second way in which innovation iscentral to antitrust policy is
that the presence of innovation canfundamentally alter the nature of
the appropriate analysis even if one focuses ontraditional performance
measures, such as static pricingefficiency. In brief, merger analysis
forms a prediction of a proposed transaction'seffects on consumer wel-
fare by examining present characteristicsof the parties to the transac-
tion and the market setting in which thoseparties operate. Innovation
can dramatically affect therelationship between the pre-merger marketplace
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and what is likely to happen if the proposedmerger is consummated. For ex-
ample, market shares are often used asa measure of market power.
But in theory at least, significant innovationmay lead to the rapid dis-
placement of a supplier that, by traditionalmeasures such as current
market share, appears to be dominant. This situationraises the broad
question of how merger analysis should form predictions aboutthe
likely competitive effects of a proposed transaction. We wifirefer to
this second role for innovation in merger analysisas the innovation im-
pact criterion.
Under the innovation incentives criterion,one asks how the change
in market structure and competition brought about bya merger will
likely affect consumer welfare through effectson the pace or nature
of innovation that might reduce costsor bring new products to
consumers. Under the innovation impact criterion, the situation is
reversed. It refers not to how market structure will affect innovation
but to how innovation will affect the evolution of marketstructure
and competition. Innovation is a force that could make staticmeasures
of market structure unneliable or irrelevant, and the effects ofinnova-
tion may be highly relevant to whether amerger should be challenged
and to the kind of remedy antitrust authorities chooseto adopt.
The two ways that innovationmay factor into merger analysis have
important policy implications. To the extent that innovationis itself
a significant objective, antitrust agencies need to understand the rela-
tionship between market structure and innovation ina given case with
sufficient depth to distinguish legitimate from merelyopportunistic
claims that the merger wifi benefit,or at least not harm, innovation
incentives. Similarly, the fact that innovationmay affect the post-
merger marketplace in ways that are hard to predict challengesmerger
authorities to devise ways to distinguishmere claims by the merging
parties that they face potential competition because of innovation from
situations in which such potential entry really exists. Finally, theim-
portance of innovation incentives raises the question of whether theen-
forcement guidelines and precedent aimed at promotingconventional
competitive goals of low prices and high outputare consistent with
promoting the goal of efficient innovation.7 To the extent thattension
exists between innovation and static economic goals ofmerger policy,
merger enforcement wifi have to develop a framework for deciding
how to make trade-offs between those objectives. Ifmerger author-
ities wish to take a more dynamic approach to maximizingconsumer
or social welfare, our analysis suggests that merger policy should112 Katz and Shelanski
strengthen its basic framework by adding to its current setof tools
and by developing a more sophisticated approach forincorporating
uncertainty about future economic events into decisionmaking.
In this paper, we explore both of the avenues throughwhich innova-
tion affects, and is affected by, merger policy. We beginin Section II by
considering three illustrative scenarios of the impact ofinnovation on
the central concerns of merger policy. As background,in Section III,
we review the establishedframework for merger enforcement. hi Sec-
tions IV and V, we examine how successfully thatframework is likely
to be in addressing the different challengesrelated to innovation. To il-
lustrate how these challenges are met in practice, in SectionVI we dis-
cuss and evaluate several merger casesin which the antitrust agencies
have focused on innovation. We conclude inSection VII with some
observations about the current relationship between mergerpolicy
and innovation and about the possible evolution of thatrelationship.
II.Defining Innovation in a Merger Context
Implicit in any discussion of how innovation might factor into merger
analysis is a definition of innovation. The concept of innovation can
span a spectrum of activities rangingfrom pure research aimed at
making discoveries in basic science to developmental activitiesthat ap-
ply known scientific results tothe improvement of existing products or
production processes. The closer the innovation at issue in aparticular
merger is to resulting in an identifiable,predictable product, the more
likely the issue for merger review wifi be how the innovationwifi af-
fect future structure and performance in the productmarket relevant
to the transaction (i.e., the innovation impactcriterion). The farther the
innovation is from a tangible result, the more likelythe question for
merger authorities wifi be how the transactionwifi affect the likelihood
and level of continued investment in R&D (i.e., the innovationincen-
tives criterion). To ifiustrate further how the questionfor merger policy
changes as the nature of the innovation changes, we nextdiscuss three
abstract cases showing the different problems thatdifferent forms of
innovation present for merger review.
Case 1:Innovation that is well underway to create or improve definedprod-
ucts and processes. We begin by consideringsituations in which the innova-
tion efforts of the merging parties and their rivals arelargely complete.8 In
some cases, the firms may already beproduct-market competitors, with ongo-
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cases, the firms seeking to merge may not yet be competitors inany product
market, but these firms may be developing products thatwifi enable the firms
to compete with one another in oneor more product markets in the future.
Where innovation efforts are well underway buthave not yet resulted in a
tangible product, the ongoing innovationmay serve as evidence to support
treating the merging firms as potential competitors: firmsthat have made sub-
stantial investment and progress toward enteringa market are much more pre-
dictable entrants than are firms that merely could undertakesuch investment.
In the settings just described, the potential harms froma merger arise not
from the elimination of competing R&D but ratherfrom the elimination of
future product-market competition between themerging parties. Hence, the
focus of merger analysis is the conventionalone of product-market competi-
tion rather than anything specially to do with innovation.However, the pres-
ence of not-yet-complete innovative efforts complicates the predictions ofhow
the merger will affect product-market competitionbecause the central task for
merger analysis is to form predictions about what competition will looklike in
the future, with and without themerger. In the case of merging firms that
do not yet compete in a product market, definitiveevidence about cost and de-
mand conditions on which to base predictions of thestate of competition tends
to be lacking. Even where firms are already product-marketcompetitors, ongo-
ing R&D efforts may change the future competitivepositions of one or more
suppliers. The potentially dramatic effects of innovationcan greatly increase
the difficulty of predicting a merger's effectson price competition.
Case 2:Innovation-based race to market dominance. Wenext consider sit-
uations in which the innovation efforts of the mergingparties and their rivals
are the focus of the merger analysis, and product-market competitionis largely
unaffected by the merger. Such situations arise whenfirms undertake com-
peting R&D efforts and the winner of this R&Dcompetition will achieve
market dominance because of a patent, the realizationof network effects,
or some other winner-take-all phenomenon. If the process literallyis winner-
take-all, then the question of how themerger affects product-market competi-
tion, which lies at the heart of conventionalmerger analysis, simply does not
arise. In these situations, the post-innovation product marketis monopolized,
whether or not the proposedmerger is consummated. The public policy con-
cern here is whether the merger wifi diminish R&D competition and thusei-
ther retard the introduction of a new productor result in a product that offers
consumers smaller net benefits.
In some markets subject to strong technologicalprogress, this process may
play itself out repeatedly. That is, competitionmay take the form of a succes-
sion of so-called temporary monopolists who displaceone another through in-
novation. At any one time, little or no head-to-headprice competition exists,
but significant innovation competition existsover time. This pattern of compe-
tition is often referred to as Schumpeterian rivalry,after Joseph Schumpeter,
who asserted that it is a central feature of themodern economy. As we
shall discuss below, some observers havequestioned whether central elements
of conventional merger analysisare at all helpful in understanding Schumpe-
terian competition.114 Katz and Shelanski
Case 3:Commercially rational delay in competitive innovation.Our final
case ifiustrates the fact that there canbe a tension, and hence the need to make
a trade-off, between staticand dynamic policy objectives. When successful in-
novation cannot be protected from replication or imitationby competitors, per-
haps because of weak intellectual property rights, afirm may not race for the
lead but instead wait for another finn to do the hardwork that the waiting
firm can then copy. If all firms reason this way,then no firm wifi want to take
the lead and subsidize its competitor's R&D, andthe result will be a waiting
game. Innovation will bedelayed, possibly forever. In this case, antitrust
agencies may face a choice between (1) allowingthe waiting firms to merge
and internalize the free-riding problem, whichwould then hasten innovation
but end product-market competition, and (2)blocking the merger, which
would preserve product-market competition for existingproducts but might
significantly or permanently delay the development andintroduction of new
products. In other words, the choice is whether to promotelong-run innova-
tion or protect short-run product pricing competition.
As we discuss below, actual enforcement choices maynot be as polarized as
in this hypothetical. In particular, alternativeinstitutions, such as research joint
venturesunder which competing suppliers jointly invest ininnovation and
share the results among themselvesmay allow firms tocooperate in the con-
duct of R&D while remaining product-marketcompetitors. Hence, the evalua-
tion of these alternative institutions may be an importantcomponent of merger
analysis in certain situations where innovation is animportant dimension of
market performance.
Each of the three cases implies a distinct kind of mergerinquiry and
hence ifiustrates the different ways in whichinnovation can factor into
merger policy. The first two casesrepresent the ends of a spectrum that
begins with conventional considerations ofactual or potential competi-
tion in product markets, where innovation serves assupporting evi-
dence, and runs all the way to cases in whichinnovation is the sole
or central concern of the mergeranalysis. The third case ifiustrates that
situations can exist in the middle where therepotentially are signifi-
cant trade-offs between static anddynamic competition or there is a
need to evaluate alternative institutions in termsof both types of effi-
ciency considerations simultaneously.
III. A Brief Review of the U.S. Legal Processand Preview of the
Issues Raised by Innovation
To understand the implications of innovationfor the application of
merger policy, we next present abrief survey of the current U.S.
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focus is on the United States, it is worth observing that theEuropean
Commission and many other competition policyagencies in other
regions and nations have modeled their merger-reviewprocesses in
whole or in part on the U.S. approach.
Legal and Economic Underpinnings
The choice of welfare standard is a central feature ofany public policy
toward mergers. Economists generally favorsome notion of economy-
wide efficiency, while the statutesare often interpreted as imposing a
consumer-welfare standard.9 Although some antitrustcommentators
write as if the pursuit of economic efficiency and themaximization
of consumer welfare are identical objectives, theyare not.10 The critical
difference is that an economic efficiency objective considers theeffects
of actions on the welfare of both producers andconsumers, while a
consumer-welfare standard considers only the latter. Aswe wifi dis-
cuss below, the choice between these two standards can have profound
effects on merger analysis, particularly when innovation issignificant.
The fundamental premise of merger policy, and of antitrustpolicy in
general, is that increased competition results in improvedeconomic
performance.11 Specifically, antitrust policy is groundedon the belief
that competitive markets do the best job of producingand delivering
at the lowest feasible prices the goods and servicesconsumers want.
The vast majority of mergers that are challenged in the UnitedStates
by federal antitrust agencies are challenged under Section7 of the
Clayton Act, which makes it ifiegal forone company to acquire some
or all of the assets of a competitor where the effects "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to createa monopoly."12
Both the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (Justice
Department) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)are charged
with enforcing the Clayton Act. The Justice Departmentcan seek to
block a merger by filing a complaint in federal districtcourt. The FTC
can bring a case before its own administrative law judgesor in a fed-
eral district court.13 The cases filed in district court only rarelyproceed
to trial. Typically an agency's filing of a complaint eithercauses the
merger to be called off or to be resolved through a consent decree that
incorporates remedies against potential post-merger harmto competi-
tion. Examples of each outcome, respectively,are the recently scuttled
merger between Echostar and DirecTV, against which the Justice De-
partment ified a complaint in 2003, and the merger between Pfizer and116 Katz and Shelanski
Wamer-Lambert, completed in 2000 subject to remedies after theFTC
filed a complaint against that transaction.
The Justice Department and the FTC have issued a setof Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, (Merger Guidelines) that purport toprovide a blue-
print for how the agencies wifi conduct their analysisof a merger.'4
Note that the Merger Guidelines do not have theforce of law and, in-
deed, the Merger Guidelines explicitly (and accurately) statethat the
agencies may pursue different lines of argument inlitigation.'5 None-
theless, the Merger Guidelines are broadly adopted by theagencies and
the courts.16
In practice, merger policy in the United Statesfocuses on how the
merging parties' combination will affect concentrationin one or more
relevant markets.17 This determination is made because an increasein
concentration in the relevant product and geographicmarkets is taken
as a proxy for a decrease incompetition thatif large enoughwill
lead to a significant increase in the prices faced byconsumers.18 In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, for example, theSupreme
Court defined the relevant product as a cluster ofservices that consti-
tute commercial banking and defined therelevant geographic market
as the four-county area in whichthe merging parties had offices.'9 The
Court held that a merger between the region's firstand second largest
banks, which would have given the merged entity a 35 percentmarket
share measured in terms of assets, createdimpermissible concentration
and had to be enjoined.2° As we shall discuss, ongoingdebate dis-
cusses the degree to which changes inconcentration levels are accurate
predictors of the likely competitive effects of a merger,especially when
innovation is an important feature of the industryunder examination.
The Legal Anal,'tical Process
The courts use a largely standardized process toevaluate mergers
when the agencies bring legal challenges. We brieflyoutline the stages
in that process.
Market Definition.Market-share calculations typically play a central
role in merger litigation. To calculate shares, it is necessary todefine
the relevant market in which various suppliers haveshares.2' Thus,
defining the boundaries of one or more markets with respect totheir
product and geographic scopes is a first stepunder the Merger Guide-Merger Policy and Jnnovation 117
lines and is also typicallyan issue early in any antitrust case in the U.S.
courts.22
A long-standing principle by whicheconomists define the product
scope of a market is to include two goodsor services in the same rele-
vant market if consumers view themas sufficiently close substitutes
and not to include them in thesame relevant market if consumers
do not view them as sufficiently close substitutes.23A similar logic is
used for geographic scope. Whenare substitutes sufficiently close to
be included in the same market? Tosome extent, chocolates compete
with automobiles for consumers' dollars, butone should not conclude
that chocolates and automobilesare in the same product market.
To give more precision to theconcept of sufficiently close substitutes,
economists undertaking market delineationexercises often conduct a
so-called hypothetical monopolist test. Thistest asks whether a hypo-
thetical, profit-maximizing monopolistover a group of products in
a given area could profitably raise prices abovea specified level by
a small but significant amount for a sustained periodof time.24 The
group of products considered in the test isa candidate relevant market.
The smallest group of products that satisfiesthe test constitutes a rele-
vant market. 25
A price increase will raise a hypotheticalmonopolist's profits unless
unit sales volume falls sufficiently to offsetthe higher price received
for the units sold.26 Thus, the hypotheticalmonopolist test indicates
that a set of products ora geographical area constitutes a relevant
market f the hypothetical monopolist couldmake a small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory increase in price withoutcausing so many con-
sumers to switch to substitute goods that the priceincrease becomes
unprofitable.
The hypothetical monopolist test isused both by enforcement
agencies and by the courts that reviewagency actions. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, forexample, reversed the FTC's
injunction of a merger between two hospitalshi a single town on the
grounds that the FTC had failed to show thatits narrow definition of
the relevant market could satisfy thehypothetical monopolist test.27
Although the courts and enforcementagencies emphasize defin-
ing relevant markets, it is widely believedamong economists that a
proper economic analysis does not require formal marketdefinition
and that an overreliance on the mechanicsof market definitioncan
be an obstacle to sound analysis. ProfessorJonathan Baker, a formerDirector of the U.S. Federal TradeConunission's Bureau of Economics,
observed:
Indeed, if a merger can be shown to harmcompetition directly, antitrust
should not need to spend much effort onmarket definition....I]f the likely
harm to competition from a merger canbe demonstrated directly, there exists
a market where harm wifi occur,but there is little need to specify the market's
precise boundaries.28
Similarly, Professor Janusz Ordover, a formerDeputy Assistant Attor-
ney General forEconomic Analysis at the Department of Justice, wrote:
From the perspective of economic theory,antitrust law's preoccupation with
market definition has always seemedsomewhat peculiar Arguments for and
against a merger that turn upon distinctionsbetween broad and narrow mar-
ket definitions are, to an economic purist, aninadequate substitute for, and a
diversion from, sound direct assessment of amerger's effect.29
Nonetheless, market definition continues toplay an important role in
practice. Indeed, it is often said that the outcomeof merger litigation
turns almost entirely on whetherthe market is defined narrowly or
broadly.3°
The "Analysis" of Market Shares.Once a relevant market has been
defined, one can calculate shares. Legally, arebuttable presumption
maintains that a high resulting level ofconcentration indicates a com-
petitive problem.31 In addition, the Departmentof Justice and the FTC
often take increases in concentration as a reasonto be concerned about
a merger whendeciding whether to pursue an enforcementaction.32
No general theorem of economics provesthat higher concentration
leads to higher prices or lower output. However,absent innovation,
one can expect thisrelationship for several reasons. First, many(but
not all) formal economic modelsof markets likely to attract merger
scrutiny (i.e., those markets in whichonly a few firms compete) indi-
cate that equilibrium output fallsand equilibrium prices rise as the
number of firms declines. This situation isespecially true in markets
where firms cannot quickly and easily adjustoutput levels as they
vie to take the market share of the exitingfirm. Empirically, substantial
evidence supports the theoreticalcorrelation of prices and market con-
centration.33 U.S. consumers have readily experiencedthis phenome-
non in markets such aslong-distance and wireless telephone services,
air travel, and pharmaceuticals. Tobe sure, in other models and under
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specified conditions, increased concentrationmay not lead to higher
prices and entry may not lead to lower prices.Hence, the use of market
shares is only the starting point for the analysisof market power.
The Analysis of Other Market Conditions.If the plaintiffs establish
that a merger wifi lead to high levels ofconcentration, then the defen-
dants attempt to rebut the presumptionof a competitive problem by
pointing to other factors, suchas the possibility of entry by new com-
petitors or certain market characteristics thatcan make it difficult to
raise prices (e.g., the presence of large, sophisticatedbuyers who can
exert bargaining pressure). As the Merger Guidelinesrecognize, "market
share and concentration data provideonly the starting point for
analyzing the competitive impact ofa merger."34 A complete analysis
considers both the abifities and incentivesof competitors to expand
their output levels and/or change theattributes of their products in
response to price changes by the merging parties that wouldharm
consumers.
Efficiencies.If the analysis of market shares and othermarket char-
acteristics demonstrates thata proposed merger wifi not give rise to
a significant competitive problem, one can conclude that themerger
wifi not harm competition andconsumers. But if a significant competi-
tive problem is predicted by the precedingstages of analysis, then
one must conduct another stage of review to predictcorrectly whether
a proposed merger wifi benefit or harmconsumers. Simply put, a
merger that is expected to give the merging parties the abilityto raise
prices profitably might nonetheless leadto lower prices or at least to
greater social welfare if the merger gives riseto sufficient cost savings
of the right sort. These cost savingsare referred to as efficiencies.35
Not all cost savings countas efficiencies. First, the savings must be
merger-specific.36 If a simple, arms-lengthtransaction would allow the
parties to reap the cost savings insome way that would not raise com-
petitive concerns, then those cost savings donot justify the merger. As
should be readily apparent, itcan often be extremely difficult to assess
whether a practical alternative exists forrealizing the cost savings.
More generally, it is typically difficultto predict with any certainty the
magnitude of cost savings likely to result froma proposed merger be-
cause doing so entails making predictions about the resultsof combin-
ing complex operations and corporate cultures.120 Katz and Shelanski
Remedies.Several public policy responses are available ifanalysis
indicates that the effect of a merger in itsproposed form may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or to tend to create amonopoly. One,
of course, is simply to block the transaction.Often, however, less dras-
tic steps are available that can allow amodified version of the transac-
tion to take place. In theory, suchremedies allow the realization of
efficiencies while averting the harms thatmight otherwise arise from
the loss of competition between the twomerging suppliers. Potential
remedies include the divestiture of assetswhere competitive overlaps
are particularlysignificant, the mandatory licensing ofintellectual
property to other firms to allow them to compete moreeffectively with
the merging parties, and limitations onthe merged firm's conduct (e.g.,
a requirement to offerthe same prices to all customers to preventthe
merged firm from targeting customers whoseonly practical options
were the two mergingsuppliers).
The Interaction of Merger Policy andIntellectual Property Policy
Merger policy is part of a broader legalframework governing business
behavior. Intellectual property law isanother part of that framework
of particular relevance to the interactionof merger policy and innova-
tion. Various methods are availablefor obtaining intellectual property
rights, including in-house invention, licensing,and merger. Patents,
copyright, and trademarks are all assetssubject to Clayton, Section 7.
Even though intellectual property rights aresometimes said to give
the holder the right to a monopoly, a mergerdoesn't get a free pass be-
cause it involvesintellectual property.
In the past, a widely held view wasthat a fundamental tension
existed between intellectual propertyrights and antitrust policy,
such as merger enforcement.37 In this view,intellectual property rights
regimes create monopolies to spur innovation,while merger policy
seeks to prevent monopolies from forming.The modem view holds
that both intellectual property policyand merger policy seek to pro-
mote consumer welfare by creating aneconomic environment in which
innovative activities are stimulated by bothcompetition and the prom-
ise of returns to successfulinnovation.38 In this regard, both sets of pol-
icies have something else in common: therelationships among public
policy, market structure, and innovation arecomplex, and it is some-
times difficult to know what policy bestpromotes innovation and con-
sumer welfare.Merger Policy and Innovation 121
The intellectual property rightsregime can interact withmerger
enforcement in interestingways. The presence of strong intellectual
property rights regimes, such as patent and copyright,may facffitate
licensing by increasing the extentto which licensing contractsare
enforceable. In contrast, licensingcan be difficult in situations where
intellectual property is protected throughsecrecy. For instance, a seller
cannot afford to reveal its technology toa potential licensee because
the licensee may then simplyappropriate the information. And it is
also difficult to limit a licensee's disseminationof the information. The
feasibility of licensing due toa strong intellectual property rights re-
gime has at least twoconsequences for merger policy. First, when the
primary efficiencies claimed fora merger involve intellectual property
assets, the question arises whether licensingcould serve as a less-
restrictive alternative to a fullmerger. Second, when licensing is fea-
sible, it can be used in fashioninga remedy to a proposed merger that
raises significant concerns of competitive harms.
The fact that licensingcan form the basis for merger remedies sug-
gests that intellectual property (IP) policy andmerger policy can be
complementary. A firm maymerge and still reap the benefits of its in-
novation through licensing royalties, while thatsame licensing can pre-
serve competition in innovation that the transaction wouldotherwise
harm. As our later discussion of specificmergers wifi show, licensing
remedies have becomean important tool in the review and clearance
of mergers in which innovation isa central feature. Only if one takes
the extreme position that IP-relatedcompetitive harm can never form
the basis for blocking a merger, ostensiblyon grounds that such a basis
would constitute a limitation of the IF right, domerger policy and IF
policy necessarily come into conflict.
IV.The Impact of Innovationon Competition
The merger-review process described in Sectionifi has well-known
problems that arise whetheror not innovation is significant. In the
present section and the one following,we identify particular chal-
lenges created by the presence of significantinnovation. In the present
section, we address how thepresence of significant actual or potential
innovation affects application of the legalanalytical framework to
the consideration of product-marketcompetition and traditional, static
pricing concerns. In the next. section,we wifi consider the issues that122 Katz and Shelanski
arise for the legal analysis when one attemptsto evaluate a merger in
terms of its effects on innovation.
Market Definition
Significant innovation raises two issues with respectto market defini-
tion for an analysis of static pricingefficiency. First, the hypothetical
monopolist test typically is applied to pricechanges ranging from 5 to
10 percent. Some have questioned thevalue of such a test in markets
where quality-adjusted prices may fall 20percent or more per year.
We believe that this objection is readilydealt with in theory, although
it is somewhat more difficult in practice.Second, and more important,
rapid innovation can make it difficult todefine relevant product mar-
kets because business executives andgovernment officials alike may
not yet know what the future productswifi be.
In American and European Unioncompetition policy, a small but
significant price increase in the context of thehypothetical monopolist
test is often taken to mean a pricechange in the range of 5 to 10 per-
cent.39 Several different criticisms have been maderegarding applica-
tion of this approach to markets withrapid technological progress,
where prices might fall by 20 percent or moreannually.4°
One critique is that a 5 or 10 percentprice increase is "too small"
when quality-adjusted prices are routinelychanging by much greater
amounts.41 However, neither those offering this critique northe Merger
Guidelines themselves discuss the rationalefor considering a price
increase of any particular size. It isapparent that the intent of the
Guidelines' approach is to consider a price changethat would have a
significant effect on consumer welfare. It is lessapparent that a 10 per-
cent increase becomes insignificantsimply because the baseline is
rapidly falling. One should also keep in mindthat the hypothetical mo-
nopolist test is only one part of the competitiveanalysis.
Another criticism is that the hypotheticalmonopolist approach to
defining market boundaries conducts a testbased on the assumption
that other suppliers hold their prices constantwhen such prices may
in fact be falling. This criticism issomewhat misplaced: under the hy-
pothetical monopolist test, the prices ofpotential substitute products
are assumed not to change in responseto a change in the monopolist's
price, but this assumption does notpreclude the possibility of techno-
logical progress as a driver of price changes overtime. The criticism
does, however, raise an importantquestion: what baseline prices forMerger Policy and Innovation
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the hypothetical monopolistand other suppliers should beused in
defining the productscope of a market with rapid technologicalprog-
ress? Specifically, shouldone use current or future prices?
Because the concern ofmerger analysis is with post-merger market
performance, there isan argument that it is more appropriateto use
projections of future prices, Ofcourse, forming reliable projections
can sometimes be difficult, and this difficultycan be compounded by
the fact that innovationcan itself be affected by themerger. And when
technological progress is ongoing,the scope of the productmarket
may continue to change, so that multipleprojections are necessary.
However, relying on currentprices can lead to market definitionsthat
are either too narrow (when technologicalprogress in substitute
products is rapid) or too broad(when the hypotheticalmonopolist's
product is subject to greatertechnological progress thanare substitute
products).42
A second difficulty that arisesin defining relevant markets when
innovation is important ismore fundamental. The issue is that the
agencies and the courts maynot know which products will beviable
substitutes in the near future.Under the traditional approachto mar-
ket definition, the central aim,whether one uses the hypotheticalmo-
nopolist test or some other algorithm,is to identify existing products
that are at present meaningfulsubstitutes for one another froma con-
sumer's perspective. When innovationis significant, the analysismay need to be muchmore forward-looking. Innovationmay result in the
creation of new products thatcompete in the relevant market,or inno-
vation may lower the costs ofproducing existing products thatare, at
present, too expensive to be consideredviable substitutes for the prod-
ucts of the merging parties.
The brevity of our discussionshould not be takenas a sign that
this problem is minoror readily dealt with. Conceptually, theissues
are straightforward and are compatiblewith the Merger Guidelines'
market definition framework,as long as that framework is appliedon
a forward-looking basis.43 However, thepractical difficulties of projec-
ting future substitution possibilitiesin a fast-changing and highlyun-
certain environment shouldnot be minimized.
The Use of Market Share in DynamicMarkets
Once a market has been delineated,the suppliers participating in that
market can be identified andone can develop a measure ormeasures124
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of market shares. The difficultiesin identifying future substitutesdis-
cussed in the previous subsectionhave important analogues inidenti-
fying market participants andcalculating market shares.
Relatively little attention tends tobe paid to the identificationof
competitors in most mergeranalyses perhaps because this partof the
analysis is relatively easy or atleast is perceived to be a simple count-
ing exercise once marketboundaries have been set. Theconventional
focus is on actual rather thanpotential competitors, the latter ofwhich
are included inthe market only when certainconditions of imminence
and probabifity are met. Butwhen innovation is important,identify-
ing potential innovationand product-market competitors maybe par-
ticularly critical to understandingcompetition. Identifying potential
competitors is often difficult, andcompetitive potentiality in the inno-
vation context often hinges onthe possession of certainskills and
information assets that can beparticularly hard to identify and mea-
sure. In the otherdirection, the existence of ongoinginnovation efforts
can render claimsof potential product-marketcompetition more
readily verifiable.
Innovation also raises afundamental question with respect tothe
calculation and interpretation ofmarket shares as predictors of the
static price and output effectsof a merger.44 That question iswhether
current product-marketshares are meaningful predictorsof future
competitive conditions and thusrelevant to the prediction of the price
and output effects of a merger.If a market is in constantturmoil be-
cause of dramaticinnovation, the argument goes,then what does one
learn from current productsales?
Even without innovation, there arereasons to be cautiousabout the
interpretation of market-share data.To generate sensible predictionsof
the effects of a merger, themeasurement and analysis ofmarket shares
should always be tied to a coherenttheory of competitive effects that
fits the facts of the industryunder consideration.45 Putanother way,
the analysis of market shares canmost confidently be used topredict
adverse competitive effectsof a merger when one has anempirically
supported theory that market shares areinformative of competitive
conditions and that an increase inconcentration will harm competition
and consumers.
In general, high marketshare is not in itself sufficient toshow
market power. One reason isthat many market-share measures are
backward-looking (e.g., shares ofinstalled base) or at best contempora-
neous (e.g., sharesof sales to customers who are new tothe industry).Merger Policy and Innovation
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As such, market shares reflect wherefirms were or are but notneces-
sarily where they are going. Thisshortcoming is particularly criticalin
industries characterized by significantinnovation and dramatic tech-
nological change. Innovationmay render market shares unstable and
hard to predict. Even if themerged firms would have a dominantmar-
ket share immediatelypost-merger, another firm in the marketcould
produce the next greatnew advance and leave the merged entity be-
hind.46 Indeed, market sharesmay be altogether irrelevant insome
cases because there may be markets in whichinnovation is so charac-
teristic and sustained that firmscompete not just for market share but
for markets as a whole. A finn'smonopoly today may say little about
the firm's prospects one, two,or five years from now.
The Merger Guidelines recognize that,in changing markets, current
market share may be an inaccuratemeasure of a firm's forward-
looking competitive significance.47A strong consensus existsamong
economists that rival suppliers' capacityto enter and expand ina
market must be considered in additionto market share data. It isespe-
cially imperative thatmerger enforcement agencies look beyondmar-
ket share data in markets characterizedby innovation.
Remedies
Innovation gives rise to intellectualproperty, which sometimes figures
prominently in merger remedies. Mergingfirms sometimes agree to
divest or license intellectualproperty to keep product-market competi-
tion from being lost. For example,in 2001, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice filed a complaint challengingthe proposed acquisition of DTM
Corporation (DTM) by 3D SystemsCorporation (3D).48 The firmscom-
peted in the sale of rapid prototyping(NP) systems, which transform
a digitally encoded design intoa three-dimensional object. The pro-
cess can be used to produce models andeven low-volume production
quantities by what might be looselythought of as three-dimensional
laser printing.
Both 3D and DTM held extensivepatent portfolios related to NPsys-
tems production that prevented firmsthat sold NP systems abroad
from competing in the UnitedStates. As discussed in Section VI, the
Department of Justicewas concerned that the merger would signifi-
cantly reduce competition. TheDepartment of Justice and theparties
reached a settlement that required3D and DTh4 to grant a nonexclu-
sive license to manufacture and sellproducts under the defendants'126 Katz and Shelanski
RP patent portfolios withinspecific fields of use.49 The idea was to
allow a foreign supplier to enterthe U.S. market as a replacementfor
the loss of an independentcompetitor through merger. Thelicensee
was required to be afirm currently manufacturingindustrial RP sys-
tems in a foreign market, sothat it would have a demonstratedability
to compete.5°
As a general matter, there are twoantitrust rationales for compilE-
sory licensing: (1) toremedy a refusal to license that itself isheld to be
exclusionary and to constitute an antitrustviolation, and (2) to amelio-
rate the effects of anotheraction that is ifiegal orabsentlicensing
would be prohibited under theantitrust laws. Licensing as a remedy
in a merger case falls into thissecond category.
It is useful to distinguish between aduty to deal and licensing as
a remedy becausethey may have completelydifferent effects on
incentives to innovate. Ageneral duty to deal under antitrustlaw
compromises the scope of intellectualproperty rights and may create
disincentives to engage in certaininnovative efforts. In contrast, com-
pulsory licensing as a remedy thatallows a merger to go through
may not weakeninnovation incentives andtheoretically could even
increase them. For example, supposethat the licensing allows a
merger to be completedthat would otherwise be blocked.To the
extent that licensing is a meansof restoring competition that is less
costly to the defendant than arealternatives (e.g., dissolving the
merger), the defendant benefits fromhaving created intellectual prop-
erty that can be incorporatedinto a remedy. While it is farfrom evi-
dent that these positive effects onR&D are significant, the argument
does suggest that any negativeincentive effects may be insignificant.
Post-Merger Considerations
Innovation considerations mayalso affect antitrust policy toward a
merged entity after an acquisition isconsummated. If a merger turns
out to have anticompetitiveeffects, it is at least theoreticallypossible
to "unscramble the eggs"and order the newly formed enterpriseto
break itself into its previous components orto divide along some other
basis that would restore competition.Such divestiture is easier when
the harm to competition stemsfrom consolidation of physical assets
that can be sold off cleanly. Post-mergerdivestiture is potentially a
much messier prospect when theharm stems from consolidationof
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ordered to sell off a research unit,employees cannot be required to
remain with that unit, and the end result mightbe to weaken the
merged entity without restoring competition.
Difficult challenges may arise in determiningwhen and how the
antimonopoly provisions of Section 2 of the ShermanAct should apply
to innovative firms.51 Supposea merged entity turns out to become
dominant. Separating the degreeto which the dominance flows from
beneficial innovation or fromanticompetitive actions can be difficult.
Much of the public debate surroundingthe Department of Justice's
pursuit of Microsoft, for example, involvedprecisely that question.
Even defining a violationcan be particularly difficult. Is integration of
increasingly advanced functions intoa product efficient innovation or
anticompetitive tying or bundling? Andonce a violation is proven, it
can be especially difficult to design a remedy ina fast-moving environ-
ment of technological change. Antitrust authoritiesface the challenge
of crafting remedies that constrainanticompetitive behavior without
reducing innovation or network benefits thatmay have accrued to
consumers.
A detailed analysis of how innovationaffects application of antitrust
laws generally is beyond thescope of this paper. But the purpose of
our brief discussion here is to show that, in considering therole anti-
trust might play in the post-merger environment,innovation cannot
be ignored as a force after themerger there as well as in the merger
context. The complexity that innovationmay introduce into the possi-
bilities for later antitrust scrutiny of themerged firm in turn lendspar-
ticular importance to getting themerger review right in the first place.
V.The Impact of Competitionon Innovation
Next we consider the issues that arise forthe legal analytical process of
merger review when one attempts to evaluatea merger in terms of its
effects on innovation. Aswe shall discuss, incorporating innovation
effects into the analysisposes fundamental challenges, althoughwe
believe that these challenges ultimatelycan be met.
Market Definition
The purpose of defining relevant marketsis to identify the boundaries
of competition. When competition takesthe form of innovation,a fun-
damental issue is whethera focus on product markets is appropriate.128 Katz and Shelanski
An argument in favor of taking aproduct-market focus is that the ulti-
mate aim of innovation is to createproducts and processes that allow
the innovator (or its licensees) to competesuccessfully in one or more
product markets. An argument against thisapproach is that the notion
of a well-defined product market is toolimiting because the success-
ful products of the future cannot bepredicted with any degree of cer-
tainty. A potential response is toconsider markets defined in terms
of innovation capabifities rather thanspecific products. But even here,
one must ultimately tiethe analysis to some notion of(potentially)
competing products to know which innovationcapabifities are impor-
tant. One way of reconcilingthese two views is to observe that prod-
uct markets matter but thatfuture boundaries and the possibility of
potential competition play much greater rolesthan in static analyses.
Consider two firms wishing to merge thathave strong R&D capabil-
ities in similar areas but are notsignificant product-market competitors
with one another either because they do notcompete in any product
market in common or because the marketsin which they do compete
with one another are unconcentrated.From the standpoint of static
price competition, presumptively nopublic policy rationale exists for
blocking the merger. But if the firms are theonly two or are among the
few firms that have the capabffity toundertake substantial innovation
efforts, then the antitrust agenciesmight nonetheless be concerned
with the consumer-welfare effects of theproposed merger.
Antitrust enforcers might be concernedeither that (1) the two firms
would have otherwise engaged in competingR&D efforts that would
have led to their becoming directproduct-market competitors, or (2)
the merged firm wifi reduce R&D tothe detriment of consumers.
The first of these concerns is aboutpotential competition in the par-
ticular product market(s) at issue inthe merger. The second concern,
however, is about innovation. This concernarises even whenin
the non-merger counterfactualtheinnovation under consideration
might not lead to product-market competition.These two concerns
raise legal and economic issues formarket definition and the sub-
sequent competitive-effects analysis.
A first issue arises from the factthat potential competition cases are
difficult to bring successfully in the UnitedStates. Courts tend to be
skeptical of claims that a merger will harm consumersby reducing
future competition between two mergingfirms that are not at present
competing with one another.52 A secondissue is that it may be ex-
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what the product wifi be. Inresponse to these difficulties, Richard Gil-
bert and Steven Sunshine, then workingat the Department of Justice,
introduced the concept of innovation markets.53Instead of potential
competition in product markets, theconcept shifts attention to actual
competition in innovation markets. As discussedabove, one can ques-
tion whether a separate concept is neededon the grounds that all com-
petitive concerns ultimately tie tosome market in which goods and
services are offered to consumers. And inpractice, although innova-
tion markets were used in United Statesv. General Motors Coip., since
then they have been little mentioned.54
Whether or not a separate concept is useful,the underlying idea that
the set of competitors is sometimes bestidentified by examining which
firms have the skills and assetsneeded to compete effectively isa
sound one. Thus, one of the challengesthat arises in applying thecur-
rent merger-review framework to innovationis to adapt a concept
of market definition basedon consumers' substitution among existing
products to one based on firms' capabifitiesto engage in innovation to
create new substitute products. Undera forward-looking approach, in-
stead of identifying what productscompete with each other today and
which firms produce those products,antitrust authorities would have
to determine which assets and skifisare needed to innovate and how
many firms possess those skifis and assets. These inquiriesare funda-
mentally different: one is basedon the behavior of consumers and the
other is based on the capabffities of firms.
Market Share and the Concentration-CompetitionPresumption
Even if the market in which innovation takesplace can be well defined,
the question arises of how changesin market structure wifi affect
the performance of that market. Theuse of market-share data to
predict a merger's likely effectson innovation competition raises two
fundamental issues. The first is whetherone should consider concen-
tration of product sales or concentration ofR&D capabilities. R&D is
conducted with an eye toward the future.Thus, one can raise serious
doubts about the value of currentproduct-market sales as indexes of
the state of innovation competition.55The threat of entry or potential
competition may be a strongerspur to innovation efforts than to lower-
ing current prices and increasingcurrent output.56 Indeed, even R&D
programs that never succeed in developingnew products or processes
may nonetheless benefit consumers by stimulatingpotential rivals to130 Katz arid Shelanski
innovate. Although these issues areimportant, they are similar to those
just discussed in the context ofmarket definition.
Our focus in the remainder of thissection is thus on the second issue:
is concentrationwhethermeasured by product-market sales or the
number of viable R&D competitorsareliable basis for predicting the
strength of innovation competition? Evenif market shares were likely
to remain stable post-mergerand the transaction trulEy would concen-
trate the market in a sustained way,that concentration may affect
innovation incentives differently fromhow it affects static economic
variables like price and output.
A central tenet of merger policyis that markets characterized by
atomistic competition generally promote consumerwelfare better than
do concentrated markets.57 Thepresumption that increased benefits
come from anincreased number of competitors is weaker,however,
when the policy goal is not just lowerprices for a given set of goods
produced under a fixed set of technologiesbut also efficient innovative
activity by firms over time. Economictheory has long raised questions
about the degree to which increasedproduct-market competition or an
increase in the number of firmsundertaking R&D leads to an increase
in overall R&D investment.58 Boththe theoretical and empirical bases
for predicting that an increase inconcentration wifi lead to less innova-
tion are mixed.
Consider, first, the theoretical basis.Economic theory identifies
situations in which high market shares areconducive to R&D invest-
ment. For instance, the possibifityof sudden and sweeping entry, com-
bined with large up-front investmentdemands, can necessitate high
initial returns to allow costs to be recoupedbefore the next innovator
supplants the incumbent investor. A firmwith a large market share
and significant market power may betteramortize the fixed costs of
R&D and appropriate a high percentageof the R&D benefits. Con-
versely, it has been said that "[the] bestof all monopoly profits is a
quiet life."59 Considerable anecdotalevidence suggests that competi-
tion drives organizations to be moreinnovative than do protected mo-
nopoly positions.
The idea that the economic conditionsthat maximize innovation
over time may not bethe same conditions that allocate resources
efficiently in the short run was suggested overfifty years ago by
Joseph Schumpeter, who wrote that,for purposes of promoting eco-
nomic welfare, "perfect competitionis not only impossible but inferior,
and has no title to being set up as themodel of ideal efficiency."6°Merger Policy and Innovation 131
Schumpeter's argument thatmost technological innovation would
come from large corporations with marketpower and organized R&D
operations implied that the ideal ofcompetition under antitrust law
could have substantial socialcosts over time.61
Theoretical research has shown that,depending on various condi-
tions, either monopolypower or competition may lead to greater total
innovation.62 Although Schumpeterwrote mostly about large firms,
their associated economies of scale forR&D, and their ability to attract
capital and talented scientists, hiscritique of perfect competition and
discussion of the benefits of marketpower suggest that his ideal inno-
vators were not only large but dominantas well. Early theoretical
explorations of Schumpeter's claim foundthat when the polarcases
of monopoly and perfect competitionwere compared, the latter pro-
vided stronger incentives for cost-reducinginnovations.63 Subsequent
models found oligopolycompetitionamong a few firmsto be the
market structure most conduciveto development of new products and
processes.64
Although many advances and refinementshave been applied to the
model described above,65 much ofthe research on market structure
and innovation has a straightforwardintuition behind it. On theone
hand, a firm facing strongproduct-market rivalry has an incentive
to develop new products andprocesses that wifi help it improve or
defend its market position. Similarly,a firm engaged in a race with
several others to developa new patentable technology wifi be under
pressure to act quickly to win the race. On the other hand,suppliers
with many product-market rivalsmay have less ability to appropriate
the gains from innovation that makethe investment worthwhile either
because their innovationsare readily copied or invented around by
rivals or because atomisticcompetitors lack the other assets needed
to exploit their innovations fully (e.g.,a firm with a small share of the
product market may not amortize itscost-reducing innovation over
many units of output). Similarly, if many firmsare racing to obtain a
patent, each firm may conclude that its chancesof winning the race
are sufficiently small that it is not profitableto invest as much in R&D
as it would without so many competitors.
Strong intellectual property rightscan reduce some of the risks from
innovation, specifically those associatedwith rapid imitation. And
licensing may make it possible andprofitable to diffuse an innovation
throughout an industry withmany firms. Even if intellectual property
rights give the innovatora temporary monopoly, however, rivalsmay132 Katz and Shelanski
develop similar or better advancesand may circumvent the origina-
tor's patent. This risk exists forcompetitive firms and monopolists
alike. But the risk that anotherfirm wifi successfully innovate may
grow with thenumber of firms competing in therelevant product
market and, at some point, theexpected return to innovation may not
justify the cost.
A firm with significant product-market poweror few R&D rivals,
by contrast, probably has a betterchance of recouping R&D invest-
ment. Large established firmsmight be particularly adept at mar-
shaling resources for incrementalinnovation or for helping to bring
a small firm'sinvention to market. And even aprofit-maximizing
monopolistespecially an unregulated onehas anincentive to en-
gage in cost-reducinginnovations. But, because a monopolistalready
has the market share for whichcompetitive firms strive, it may have
less incentive to pursue productinnovations and improvements than
firms facing competition. Further, amonopolist wifi have an incen-
tive to innovate strategically toprotect its monopoly by excluding
rivals and by avoiding cannibalizationof its existing business, perhaps
delaying implementation of thoseinnovations it does develop. There-
fore, it might be a qualitativelyinferior innovator from the perspective
of consumers and overall economicwelfare.66
Although economic intuition suggests anoverarching presumption
that innovation wifi be most intense infirms with a mix of competitive
incentives and supracompetitive returns,it is also clear that, depend-
ing on assumptions, thetheoretical balance could swing toward either
greater competition or monopoly in agiven case. Empirical data do not
resolve the ambiguous theoreticalrelationship between competition
and innovation. Many analysessupported the Schumpeterian view by
finding a positive correlation betweenmarket concentration and R&D
investment.67 Other analyses, however, found datashowing concentra-
tion to have a negative effect oninnovation.68 An early and influential
study by F. M. Scherer indicated thatboth could be correct over a
sufficiently large range of market structuresbecause the relationship
between innovation and concentration isnonlinear. His study, which
corroborated the theoretical intuitiondiscussed above, found the rela-
tionship between market structureand innovation to follow an
inverted U pattern: innovation is observed tobe low at high levels of
competition, reach its peak at intermediatelevels of oligopoly (where
the four leading firms control roughlyhalf the market), and then fallMerger Policy and Innovation
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off as market structure approachesmonopoly.69 Several studies repli-
cated and confirmed Scherer's results.7°
Later work raised serious doubts,however, about these findings.
Indeed, in their review of theempirical literature, Cohen and Levin
concluded that "[t]ogether, these resultsleave little support for the
view that industrial concentrationis an independent, significant, and
important determinant of innovativebehavior and performance."71
One should be cautious in theinterpretation of the empirical literature
for several reasons. First,questions surround the statisticalsignifi-
cance of the parameter estimates leadingto a U-shaped relationship
and whether they are, in fact,picking up the effects of omittedvari-
ables such as technological opportunity.72Second, extreme care must
be taken in interpretingcross-sectional studies because the causality
between market structure and innovationrates can run in both direc-
tions.73 One detailed analysisof British data found that the higher
profit expectations in concentratedmarkets increased innovative activ-
ity but that, over time, innovationreduced concentration levels in the
sample industries.74 Many empiricalstudies fail to account for the fact
that market structure itself might beaffected by the perceived possi-
bilities for innovation and thatmarket structure might therefore be
a result, rather than a cause, of innovationincentives. The literature
addressing how marketstructure affects innovation (and viceversa)
in the end revealsan ambiguous relationship in which factorsun-
related to competition playan important role.
The systematic presumption thatfavors increased competition for
purposes of static pricing and output efficiencythus has no analog
when it comes to creating theoptimal conditions for innovation. By
the same token, it should be observedthat Schumpeterian claims that
merger policy should favor increased concentrationas a means of pro-
moting innovation equally lack firmempirical grounding. Where does
this observation leavemerger authorities? Meaningful generalpre-
sumptions have not been identified: innovationis affected by a variety
of market factors other thanconcentration (as well as variables related
to a firm's regulatory status, products,and technologies). Whilemore
rivalry rather than less wifi oftenremain the applicable rule of thumb,
enforcement authorities cannotas confidently presume, as a matter of
economic theory, that more competitionis beneficial or that market
power is detrimental for R&D. Although it isimpossible to make defin-
itive general statements aboutthe linkage between marketstructure134 Katz and Shelanski
and innovation, one can often makereasonable, unambiguous predic-
tions about the effects ofspecific transactions or alternativeinstitu-
tional arrangements within aparticular industry structure based on a
fact-intensive investigation.
Other Market Characteristics andCompetitive Effects Analysis
Even more so than with pricecompetition, it is necessary to lookbe-
yond market share data tounderstand innovation competition. Here
we make twobrief points. First, for the reasonsdiscussed above, it is
important to understand thedistribution of R&D assets among various
actual and potential rivals. Second,there is a sound basis for predicting
that suppliers wifi find it moredifficult to coordinate their strategies to
reduce R&D investments than toraise prices in the static sense. Al-
though the underlying principles aregenerally the same, R&D activ-
ities have certain characteristicsthat give rise to differences in practice.
For example, R&D efforts maybe more complex and moredifficult
than prices for rivals to observe,and this greater complexity and diffi-
culty observing actions both tend tomake coordinated strategies more
difficult.75 Similarly, the stochastic natureof R&D output can greatly
increase the difficulty of reachingand monitoring an agreement to re-
strict R&D efforts.
Innovation: Too Much of a GoodThing?
Once a merger's likely effect oninnovation has been predicted, an
issue arises that does not come upin the analysis of conventional,static
concerns. Although it isextremely counterintuitive to manypeople,
a large body ofeconomics literature hasestablished that profit-
maximizing firms may invest more inR&D than is sociallyefficient.76
An important implication is thatthe social welfare effects of an innova-
tion-reducing merger may be positive.This situation can arise, for ex-
ample, in patent races because ofbusiness stealing effects. In a race to
obtain a pharmaceutical patent,preempting its rivals by a day may
allow a pharmaceutical firm toobtain intellectual property rights
whose value far exceeds thesocial benefits of having thepatented
drug available one daysooner.77 In some cases, an innovation may
allow a supplier to increase itsshare of the economic pie without
increasing the total pie (e.g., a product ordatabase innovation may fa-Merger Policy and Innovation
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cffitate price discrimination havingthese effects). Suchan innovation
might have private value for theinnovator but no overall social value.
In most cases, firms will have littleincentive to over-invest in R&D
broadly. The theoretical possibilityof excessive private incentivesnot-
withstanding, as an empiricalmatter private incentives to invest in
R&D typically are too low.78 Thissituation arises because private firms
are generally unable to appropriate fully thebenefits that their R&D
generates for the economy.79 Additionally,consumers almost always
benefit from additional R&D.Even in patent race modelsin which
firms engage in more than thesocially efficient levels of R&Dexpendi-
tures, consumers would be better offif firms invested stillmore and
thus brought the fruits of innovationto the market even faster.8° Fi-
nally, firms can have sociallyexcessive incentives undera specific set
of conditions, and onecan examine any particular market to determine
if those conditionsare present. Whether enforcement authoritieswould
want to act when such conditions foroverinvestment in innovation
hold, however, raises thepossible tension betweenconsumer welfare
and social welfare whenmerger policy focuses on innovation rather
than static competition. We discussthis possible trade-off from allow-
ing mergers that reduce inefficientinnovation in the next section.
Efficiencies
Merging parties sometimes identifyincreased innovation capabffities
as a significant efficiency that wifi result fromtheir transact-ion. Thus,
it may be necessary to predictwhether a merger wifi improvethe
combined firm's innovation capabilitiesin ways that wifi generatecon-
sumer benefits. This undertakingcan be difficult for several reasons.
Indeed, the agencies themselveshave expressed skepticism aboutthis
type of merger efficiency and haveasserted that "[o]ther efficiencies,
such as those relating to researchand development, are potentially
substantial but are generally lesssusceptible to verification andmay
be the result of anticompetitiveoutput reductions."81
Potential Sources of Efficiencies.A first issue is how amerger wifi
lower the costs of R&Dor in other ways increase the merging firms'
abifities to innovate successfully.There are at least three types ofeffects
that the merging parties mightassert would occur: (1) increasedcapa-
bilities realized by combiningcomplementary assets, (2) larger firm136
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size, which somehow givesrise to a greater ability toabsorb the risks
of or fund R&D, or (3) lesscompetition and greater product-market
profits, which can then fund R&D.
With respect to combiningcomplementary assets, a fundamental
issue is whether an alternative means(e.g., licensing of complementary
intellectual property) can achieve the sameefficiencies without remov-
ing a competitor. Mergershave specific institutional featuresthat may
give rise to certain advantagesin facilitating the exchange ofcomple-
mentary assets, but the issueneeds careful attention on acase-by-case
basis.82
Considerable debate surrounds therelevance of firm size for inno-
vation.83 Following Schumpeter, someobservers have praised large
enterprises for their superiorability to attract financial andhuman
capital, bear the risk, and recoupthe investment required for sus-
tained R&D activities.Other analysts tout small firms asbeing more
creative than larger, morebureaucratic enterprises.85 Manyempirical
studies have addressed therelationship between firm size and irinova-
tion. Most recent researchyields a consensus that, in general,R&D
rises only proportionally,and only up to a point, with firmsize.86
The strength of the causalrelationship between firm size andR&D
remains somewhat questionabledespite the observed correlations.Be-
cause many variablescorrelate with firm size, it isunclear in many
studies whether firm size itself is astatistically significant factor in in-
novation. Although early studiesdid purport to findsignificance,87
others have found that whenother firm and industry characteristics
are factored in, firmsize does not significantlyaffect R&D invest-
ment.88 When the focus of analysisshifts from innovation inputssuch
as R&D expenditures tooutputs such as patents, largefirms show no
advantage at all over smallones.89 Data matching R&D investment
with patent output has in factshown that smaller firms produce more
innovations per R&D dollarand per employee than do largefirmsY°
The evidence overall thus suggeststhat, to the extent firm size has an
effect on innovation, its magnitudeand direction depend on associated
industry-level variables and aresusceptible to few general presump-
tions. The results suggest thatespecially large firms like thosecreated
by some recent mergerswifi have no special tendencynor any pre-
dictable reluctanceto engage ininnovation, and that small, fringe
firms may play important roles overtime in technologically advancing
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Lastly, consider the argument thatgreater product-market profits
make it possible for firms to conductadditional R&D. The profits-
innovation linkage has twointerpretations. One is that the potential
for product-market profitsgenerates innovation incentives. This in-
terpretation involves an issue aboutcompetitive effects and was
addressed earlier in this section. Theother interpretation is thatcur-
rent profits can generate free cash to financeR&D efforts. This inter-
pretation is more of a statement about theproduction of innovation,
and we wifi treat it asa kind of efficiency. A first observation is that
a remarkable and dangerous lack ofa limiting principle exists in this
argument. By this argument, for example, whynot grant a monopoly
in an unrelated market togenerate the cash flow needed to conduct
R&D in the market of concern? Second,given the overall efficiency of
U.S. capital markets, thisargument is inherently suspect. It is notsur-
prising that, in their review of theempirical literature someyears ago,
Kamien and Schwartz found that"[un sum, the empirical evidence
that either liquidity or profitabilityare conducive to innovative effort
or output appears slim."92
Merger Specificity.As noted above, the possibleuse of alternative
institutional arrangements, suchas research joint ventures, raises com-
plex issues in determining whetherthe efficiencies are merger-specific.
These issues arise because, in theory,two firms might be able to
separate cooperation regarding product-marketactivities from cooper-
ation with respect to R&D activities.Thus, in some casesan impor-
tant element of merger analysis isto determine whether the parties
need a merger rather thana research joint venture or some other form
of research cooperation (e.g.,intellectual property licensing) that
does not limit product-marketcompetition. Although basedon just
one industry, a recent empirical studysuggests that this issue is an
important one. Gugler and Siebertfound that research joint ventures
in the semiconductor industrymay achieve innovation efficiencies
that are comparable to thoseattained through merger butmay do so
without having the adverse effectsof mergers on product-market
competition.93
Tensions between Efficiency and ConsumerWelfare.Considera-
tion of efficiencies inmerger review typically brings to the fore the
difference between a consumer-welfarestandard and an economic-138 Katz and Shelanski
efficiency, or total-surplus, standard.Under a consumer-welfare stan-
dard, cost savings are relevant only tothe extent that they are passed
on to consumers inthe form of lower prices or betterproducts. Thus, a
consumer-welfare standard would not count asbenefits any projected
savings in corporate overheadthat are predicted to have no effect on
product prices. Nonetheless, suchsavings would represent real gains
to the economy, and theywould be counted as benefits under atotal-
surplus standard.
The analysis of efficiencies from astatic pricing perspective often
focuses solely on variable costs, onthe grounds that changes in fixed
costs wifi not affect thecalculation of profit-maximizing prices.How-
ever, a change inthe fixed costs of innovation may trigger achange
in the resulting level ofinnovation (i.e., whether a project isunder-
taken or not), which then has consequencesfor consumer welfare. Con-
sequently, it is important that fixed costs notbe summarily excluded
from the efficiencies analysis wheninnovation is at issue. Another way
of describing this point is to statethat it is important to remember that,
over a long enoughtime horizon, everything is variable.
Note that, under an efficiencystandard, one would take into account
the fact that a merger mighteliminate socially wasteful duplication
of R&D, even if doing so did notspeed up the date at which innova-
tion occurred or reducequality-adjusted product prices. Indeed, an
economic-efficiency standard would in somecircumstances count as a
benefit the fact that a merger slowedthe rate of innovation from a so-
cially excessive level, but a consumersurplus standard would find the
merger harmful. If mergerpolicy focuses more on innovation, it may
therefore have to deal with welfaretrade-offs that antitrust does not
confront in conventional product-marketcompetition cases.
One way to resolve the socialwelfare/consumer welfare trade-off
is to insist that the cost savingsfrom any reduction in innovation be
passed through in the form of lowerprices to consumers, an issue that
arises in the context of productiveefficiencies in a static merger-review
framework. But in the conventional,static-efficiencies situation, the
consumer ideally gets the sameproduct at a lower price post-merger.
In contrast, when a mergerreduces inefficient innovation, the con-
sumer at best gets adifferent (less advanced) product at alower price
post-merger and the pricereduction may not compensate for thediffer-
ence in productcharacteristics. The inabifity to compensate consumers
by passing-through cost-savings is oneconsequence of the fact, dis-
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of the R&D investment and the magnitude ofthe resulting consumer-
welfare benefit.
Developing Reliable Projections of ConsumerBenefits.Efficiencies
are typically difficult to project with any confidence,even when inno-
vation is not an issue. And for severalreasons, innovation makes the
task even more difficult. First, there isa large stochastic element of
innovation, and R&D projects often haveextremely long gestation
periods. Second, as discussed above, the driversof innovation are only
imperfectly understood. Third, where efficiency leadsto greater prod-
uct innovation and consumers have heterogeneousvaluations of qual-
ity, projecting net consumer benefitscan be complex. Finally, to the
extent that innovation involves discrete projects and fixedcost com-
mitinents, even a small change in fixedcosts can lead to a large change
in consumer welfare. This relationship holds whenthe cost change (or
other merger efficiency) tips the balancein favor of a supplier's under-
taking a discrete investment thatgenerates a large amount of con-
sumer surplus, such as the introduction of anew product. In principle,
the consumer surplus generated by thesenew services made possible
by an R&D investment can exceed themerger-specific reduction in the
costs of conducting the R&D. Thus, the agencies haveto be careful not
to measure efficiencies purely in terms of costsavings.
Remedies
Merger remedies can involve the divestitureor licensing of assets,
including intellectual property, to maintain innovationcompetition.
The challenge for merger policy in craftingremedies for cases in which
innovation is central is to identify the rightassets for divestiture or,
where those assets are intellectualproperty, for licensing. In the case
where, for example, two drugstore chains seekto merge, divestiture is
relatively straightforward in principle: theparties must divest stores
where the pre-merger firms have overlappingterritories. To be sure,
assuring that those stores are divested ina way that maintains their
competitive viability against the merged entitymay present problems,
but identifying which stores to divest tendsto be easy.
The problem is much harder when theassets to be divested are
intended to maintain competition in innovation.94Which personnel
are central to an innovation effort and where in thecompany are they
located? Is R&D conductedso that it is severable for purposes ofdivestiture? What patents are needed for aparticular R&D effort and
are alternative technologiesavailable? These questions are far from
insurmountable, but they do point out theparticular challenges that
innovation creates for remedial mergerpolicy. These questions also
suggest that refocusing conventionalanalysis wifi be necessary for
enforcement agencies in innovation cases.
Schumpeterian Competition and Merger Policy
As noted in Section II, competition in somemarkets may take the form
of Schumpeterian rivalry in which a successionof temporary monopo-
lists displace one another through innovation.At any one time, there
is little or no head-to-head pricecompetition but there is significant
ongoing innovation competition. The natureof Schumpeterian com-
petition suggests to some observers thatantitrust policy should be
less concerned with attacking businesspractices that might generate
increased monopoly profits by harmingcompetition within a market,
or should at least be more circumspectabout doing so.95 However, an
issue about specific practices' harmingcompetition "for the market"
still exists. And it is not at all clear that mergerpolicy should not be
more restrictive ratherthan less.
Proponents of the view thatgovernmental intervention should be
limited in this type of market generally arguethat merger policy is
likely to make costly errors throughenforcement that wifi have the
unintended effect of slowing innovation. As the argument goes,in dy-
namic markets, it is impossible to predictwhat wifi happen, current
market positions are irrelevant to futurecompetition, and at any point
the market wifi be monopolizedanyway.96 Therefore, the argument
concludes, firms should be allowed to combinewith relatively little
antitrust intervention in dynamic markets.
The analysis of this chapter suggeststhat the claim for systematic
laissez faire in such markets is notsoundly grounded in economics. In-
deed, a merger policy designed to fosterand protect Schumpeterian
competition might appear fairly restrictive whenviewed through the
lens of conventional merger analysis. It willnot always or even often
be true that the conditions fostering the intenseinvestment in new
technology that leads to sequential competition"for the market" will
be produced by unchecked consolidation.Indeed, Case 2 in Section II,
is one in which a merger would bechallenged precisely because it
would otherwise undermine Schumpeteriancompetition.
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Innovation would be at thecenter of the inquiry designed to deter-
mine when innovation requires antitrustagencies to intervene and
when to stand back. To understanda proposed merger's potential
effects on Schumpeterian competition,one would need to ask which
firms had the potential to be thenext temporary monopolist. The
current shares of most firms might well be largelyirrelevant to this as-
sessment. (The large share of the current temporarymonopolist would
be relevant if it indicated what thestatus quo would be until the next
wave of innovation comes crashing through themarket.) But it would
be a mistake to think the irrelevanceof current market shares inexora-
bly leads to permissivemerger policy. For instance, the Schumpeterian
approach might instead imply that thecurrent dominant firm should
be allowed to merge with essentiallyno other firm because any other
firm might be the next successfulrival. Similarly, it might be socially
optimal to block a merger betweentwo firms that had no sales of the
final product at present becauseeach may be involved in beneficial
R&D that wifi make one of them thenext market winner.
VI.Innovation Cases
The U.S. antitrust agencies have bynow reviewed several merger cases
in which innovation has beenan important factor. A review of those
cases helps one to understand how far the agencieshave been willing
to incorporate innovationconceras into merger policy and also to
assess the kinds of cases in which the agencies havebeen, or can be,
successful in that enterprise.
Early Merger Cases: Starting to TakeInnovation Seriously
One of the first merger enforcementactions expressly motivated by
innovation concerns occurred in 1990,when the FTC challenged Roche
Holding's acquisition of Genentechas likely to lessen research and de-
velopment in several biotech products.97Some of the concerns raised
by the transactionwere traditional ones of competition: for example,
Roche was on the verge of becoming themajor challenger to Genen-
tech's dominant position in themarket for products to treat human
growth hormone deficiency. Butmore central to the FTC's complaint
was that Roche and Genentech were actualcompetitors in the research
and development of important therapiesfor the treatment of AIDS
and HEV infection. Genentechwas considered to be ahead of its rivals142 Katz and Shelanski
in the development of suchtreatments, and Roche was actively
involved in a competing developmenteffort. Concerns about how
consolidation of actual R&D effortswould affect the future product
market and the pace of innovationdrove the enforcementdecision.98
In terms of the three abstract cases wediscussed above, the Roche!
Genentech case appears to fit Case 1 inSection II, in which the innova-
tion concern is tied topotential competition in an identifiableproduct
market. With respect to treatmentsfor human growth hormone defi-
ciency, Roche's potential competitiveimpact was imminent and rea-
sonably certain. While the potentialcompetition between Roche and
Genentech in the AIDS/H1V therapymarket was more speculative
because both firms were still inthe R&D phase, the competing R&D
efforts were well underway, andthe FTC found strong evidence to
support its prediction that therelevant product market would develop
and that Roche and Genentechwould be important competitors in that
market. The FTC's analysis was thus more oneof potential competitive
effects than of effects on innovation per se.
The Justice Department firstchallenged a merger on innovation
grounds in 1993, when it investigatedZF Friedrichshafen's (ZF) pro-
posed acquisition of General Motors'Affison division.99 Affison and
ZF together produced 85 percentof the world output of heavy-duty
automatic transmissions for trucksand buses but actually competed
head-to-head in few geographicmarkets.10° The Justice Department
nonetheless concluded that even marketswhose concentration would
be unaffected by the mergerwould be harmed by the transaction's
reduction in Affison and ZF's incentives todevelop new designs and
products.'°' This case therefore reflects theeconomic conclusion that
near-monopoly levels of concentration aredetrimental for innovation,
even in the absenceof any changes in static efficiencyand in the
absence of any specific developmenteffort that could be identified as
being compromised.
The Roche/'Genentech and ZFi'Affison casesboth considered inno-
vation as an issue distinct fromcompetition in an existing product
market, but there were important differencesbetween the cases. The
FTC did not have to predict that areduction in rival innovation efforts
from the increase in industry concentrationwould have resulted from
the acquisition. Rather, the increase inconcentration was accompanied
by concrete evidence that Roche wasatan advanced stage in develop-
ing a competing human growthhormone treatment and that Roche
and Genentech were the most promisingof a small group of compa-
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appeared to have reached a point where itsentry into the growth
hormone market was no longer speculative,the question was more a
conventional one of product-market competition thanof innovation.
The FTC framed the issue withrespect to AIDS/HIV therapies, how-
ever, purely as one of innovation. The FTC's focuswas on the race to
develop products, noton competition in the market for existing prod-
ucts. But the evidence was clear that both Roche andGenentech were
among few serious participants in that developmentrace. The merger
would have substantially concentrated actualnotmerely potential or
speculativeR&D efforts. In turn, themerger would have reduced the
number of players in an as yet nonexistent but likelyand predictable
future product market.
While the evidence that innovation effortswould be consolidated
makes enforcement appear warranted, it raisesan interesting question
about enforcement rationale. The Roche/Genentechcase is presented
as one about preserving innovation incentives in themarket for the
drug therapies actually under development.'02But it doesn't seem
quite right to explain the caseas being about fostering incentives for
firms to undertake innovation thatwas in fact already occurring. To
the extent that the case was about innovation,it seems more coherently
explained as preserving a market structure thathad proven itself con-
ducive to innovation and that therefore shouldnot be allowed to con-
centrate further and reduce the potential for future R&D.If that is the
underlying rationale, then thecase marks a significant departure from
conventional antitrust analysis. But thecase can also be explained
as one about conventional product-market competition, withthe evi-
dence of innovation showing that themerger would combine two fu-
ture rivals and create higher prices when the marketfor the infection
treatments at issue does eventually develop. Thatinterpretation is still
a dynamic one to which innovation is crucial but, in theend, it is
firmly within the traditional competitive frameworkof antitrust.
The Justice Department's action in the ZF/Allisoncase was different
from that in Roche/Genentech inan important respect: the Justice De-
partment found no specific R&D effort that would becompromised by
the acquisition. But the decision indicates that,if the change in concen-
tration is so great that it leavesan industry with a near-monopoly and
without other potential sources ofnew developments, potential harm
to the innovation market can justifya challenge to the transaction.
In the ZF/Affison case too, however, theunderlying rationale is
ambiguous. On the surface, itseems reasonable to block a merger that
would result in an 85 percent share of theworld market, even if fringe144 Katz and Shelanski
firms may be capable of introducinginnovations and additional com-
petition. In most cases, such a mergerwould raise concerns about both
allocational efficiency and innovation incentives.In the ZF/Affison
case, the efficiency issue wasless salient because the two companies'
geographic territories and product linesonly partially overlapped.
Only a subset of the companies' customerswould have faced a reduc-
tion in the number of competingsuppliers due to the merger. The em-
phasis of the case was therefore more onpreserving innovation
incentives in the market for heavy-dutytransmissions than on protect-
ing traditional product competition inthat market.
If companies do not compete in theproduct market, why is there
any reason to believe theycompete in the innovation market? Tobe
sure, monopolists still have someincentive to reduce costs and increase
profits, so the fact that the two companiesdo not compete in any geo-
graphical market does not mean they would noteach have incentives
to innovate. But the samelogicthat innovation incentives do not
vanish in the absence of competitioncanbe applied to the merged
entity and thus does not supply arationale for blocking a transaction
between noncompeting entities. Thisconclusion does not mean the
ZF/Affison decision was faulty. It doesindicate that separating in-
novation incentives from product-marketcompetition effects can be
difficult, and it raises some of the difficultiesin applying the frame-
work designed for static competitive analysis todynamic questions of
innovation.
One possible rationale for the JusticeDepartment's action is that it
is better over time to have twopotential innovators in the market
rather than one to preserve the potentialfor a diversity of approaches
to developing new technologyand to preserve the possibility for future
product-market competition. The ZF/Affisondecision is novel because
it preserves separate entities notfor reasons of price competition but
for reasons of future innovation. In thecontext of a merger to near-
monopoly, the idea doesn't seem so radical,but in principle it repre-
sents an important change intraditional merger analysis. The agency's
focus was not on preserving innovationtied to any particular product
or identifiable line ofresearch but instead on preserving conditions
likely to be more conducive to anyinnovation in the market sector.
The ZF/Affison merger presents arelatively easy example, however,
of such a pure innovation case. The mergerto monopoly certainly
reduced the potential for competition betweenthe two major firms.
The case gives little insight, however, intohow the agencies wouldMerger Policy and Innovation
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evaluate a case involvinga greater number of firms in which onlyin-
novation, and not product-marketcompetition, was at stake.
Transitional Cases: Innovation Movesto the Fore
The two factors centralto the Roche/Genentech andZF/Affison
caseshigh levels of concentration andparallel and competing inno-
vation effortshave also formedthe basis for severalmore recent
merger-enforcement actions through which therelationship between
antitrust and innovation has furtherdeveloped.
Aerospace Mergers.The aerospace industry isone of the most inno-
vative economic sectors in the UnitedStates. The market is character-
ized by high concentration levels butalso (outside the defense sector)
by international competition.In the late 1990s, the FTC and theDepart-
ment of Justice approved one majoraerospace merger and blocked
another, respectively. Innovationconsiderations were central to these
enforcement decisions.
In 1997, the FTC approved themerger of Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas, the two largestcommercial aircraft manufacturers inthe
United States.103 In thatcase, analysis of innovation in theaerospace
industry supported themerger, not because the transactionwas
expected to increase R&D but becausethe analysis showed that
McDonnell Douglas had fallen behindtechnologically and no longer
could exert competitivepressure on its rivals.104 Acquisition by Boeing
would therefore not reduce futurecompetition and would allow
McDonnell Douglas's assetsto be put to better use bya more techno-
logically advanced enterprise.
Concerns about progress inaerospace led to a different conclusion
in Lockheed Martin's proposedacquisition of Northrop Grumman.
The Justice Department's challengeto the merger explained that
Lockheed and Northropwere two of the leading suppliers of aircraft
and electronics systems to theU.S. military'°5 The JusticeDepartment
concluded that themerger would give Lockheed a monopoly insys-
tems for airborne early-warning radar,electro-optical missile warning,
fiber-optic towed decoys, and infraredcountermeasure systems.106 In
addition, the merger would reducethe number of competitors from
three to two in high-performance,fixed-wing military airplanes;on-
board radio countermeasures;and stealth technology.'07 TheJustice
Department contended that consolidationin these markets would lead146
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to higher prices, higher costs,and reduced innovation for productsand
systems required by the U.S.military.'08
Although traditional competitive concernsabout prices were an
important part of the JusticeDepartment's challenge to Lockheed's ac-
quisition of Northrop, innovation concernswere central. Forexample,
the Department noted thatLockheed and Northrop had bothstarted
research and development foradvanced airborne early-warning radar
systems and concluded thatconsolidation of the two R&D efforts
would harm future militaryprocurement.'°9 The Justice Department
also found evidence thatcompetition is particularly importantfor
technological advances in high-performancemilitary aircraft and that
important innovations have oftenbeen made by firms other thanthe
incumbent suppliers of particular systems.Thus, it concluded that
"competition is vital to maximizeboth the innovative ideasassociated
with each military aircraft program, aswell as the quality of the pro-
cesses used to turninnovative ideas into cost-effective,technically
sound, and efficiently producedaircraft."°
The Justice Department's conclusionin the Lockheed/Northrop case
(that preserving competition inthe relevant markets would enhance
innovation) was based principally on twofactors that weighed against
permitting the transaction: (1)evidence that Lockheed and Northrop
were either actuallyconducting competing R&D onimportant prod-
ucts or were the leadingcontenders to conduct such R&D in thefuture,
and (2) evidence that consolidationwould lead to either monopoly or
substantial dominance in relevantproduct markets, not just reducing
but in large part eliminatingcompetitive pressure. Thus, a combination
of market structure and parallelinnovation efforts pointed toward a
likely reduction in both actual andpotential innovative activity if the
merger were consummated.
Thus, to a large extent,Lockheed/Northrop fits the parametersof
Case 2 in Section II. Although apatent race was not necessarily atis-
sue, what was atstake was the race to developtechnology that would
win a major government contract,another form of a winner-take-all (or
winner-take-most) innovation contest.The Justice Department found,
at least implicitly, thatthe benefits of faster innovationand a choice
of alternative technologies offsetpossible costs of effort duplication in
the aerospace/defense sector. Inaddition, it was possible that, ifthe
two technologies that thecompetitors developed were trulysubsti-
tutes, then the governmentwould also get the benefit ofconventional
product-market competition betweenbidders for the contract. In otherMerger Policy and Innovation
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words, mixed with the innovationconcern central to the case was also
a more conventional, static pricing concern.111
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals.In the mid-1990s, the FTC fo-
cused on innovationconcerns in crafting a consent agreementwith
merging firms in the biotechnologyand pharmaceuticals industry.
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz announcedplans to merge intoa new com-
pany now known as Novartis. The FTC raisedseveral objections to the
merger.1'2 Along traditionalantitrust lines, the FTCwas concerned
that the combination wouldgive the merged entitypower to reduce
competition and raise prices in themarkets for herbicides used in
growing corn and for flea-control productsfor pets.113 The FTC accord-
ingly ordered one party to divestthose businesses.1'4 Themore novel
parts of the FTC's challenge, however, hadto do with research and de-
velopment and the prospects for futureinnovations in the market for
gene therapy productsproducts that allowtreatment of diseases and
medical conditions by modifyinggenes in patients' cells.
At the time of the FTC's investigationin 1996 and 1997, nogene ther-
apy products were on the marketor even approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).115Conventional merger analysis there-
fore did not apply becauseno product market existed in which to
analyze the merger's effectson prices and output. The FTC instead
adopted a dynamic perspective;looking to the future, it found long-
run competitive concerns. The sales ofgene therapy products were
expected to grow rapidly, withprojections for a $45 billion market by
2010.116 Ciba andSandoz were eitheramong the few or the only firms
with the technological capabilityand intellectual property rightsneces-
sary to develop gene therapy productscommercially. The FTC stated
in its complaint against theproposed merger that Ciba and Sandoz
were "two of only a few" entities capable ofthe R&D necessary to
enter the market. Together they wouldcontrol essential patents, know-
how, and proprietarycommercial rights without which otherfirms,
even if capable of developinggene therapy products, would be unable
to commercialize them. The FTCwas concerned that Novartis, the
newly named post-mergercompany, might not adequately license its
gene therapy intellectual property toensure that other firms would be
able to close the R&Dgap. The FTC concluded that "preserving long-
run innovation in these circumstances is critical."117
The FTC did not, however, blockthe merger. Instead, it crafteda
consent decree designed to correct thoseaspects of the transaction that148
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raised concerns for current andfuture competition and innovation.
As noted above, divestitureof certain overlapping herbicide andflea-
control businesses occurred. Morenotable, however, was the fact that
the FTC did not require divestitureof either firm's gene therapydivi-
sion. Instead, Ciba andSandoz agreed that they would licensetechnol-
ogy and patentssufficient for one of its major rivals tocompete against
the merged entity in the developmentof gene therapy products.'18
The FTC's remedy steered betweenthe potentially conflicting eco-
nomic effects that a mergermight have on research and development.
On one hand, consolidatingcomplementary capabilities can enhance
innovation and allow a combinationof firms to achieve what the firms
individually could not do as easily.On the other hand, concentrating
markets to near-monopoly levels candampen the pressure to innovate
and reduce the enhancedprobabifity of success that comes frommulti-
ple R&D efforts. Both concerns arereflected in the FTC's enforcement
action. The FTC declined toorder either Ciba or Sandoz todivest its
gene therapy subsidiarybecause it found that R&D effortsbetween
the parent companies and theirsubsidiaries were closely coordinated,
making divestiture disruptiveand counterproductive for innovation.
The decision instead to ordercompulsory licensing to a capable com-
petitor was designed to preserveboth competition and the benefitsof
the merging parties' relationshipswith each other and their respective
gene therapy subsidiaries.
The market context in whichthe FTC's focus on innovationoccurred
is significant. The merger did notsimply change the degree of competi-
tion within a middling rangeof market concentration. Rather, the com-
bination of Ciba and Sandozconcentrated nearly all innovation efforts
and essential inputs forcommercialization of gene therapyunder one
corporate roof. Innovation concerns weresufficient to motivate en-
forcement because the factsshowed a combination of monopoly mar-
ket structure and reduction inthe number of actual (asopposed to
potential) innovation efforts. To somedegree, this was a traditional
potential-entry case with respect toproduct-market competition. But
the action also broke important newground: it expressly recognized
that a current merger could bechallenged on grounds of future inno-
vation and competition in aproduct market that does not yetbut
likely wifiexist. Contrast this actionwith the ZF/Affison action. In
the case of ZF/Allison, the issue was aproduct market with (as yet)
nonexistent innovation; inCiba/Sandoz, the issue was innovationfor
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Recent Case Developments: MoreNuanced Analysis
The antitrust agencies' focuson innovation in merger review, which
became evident in the 1990s, hascontinued to develop. Although most
innovation cases involve advancedstages of innovationso that the
issue is more one of potentialproduct-market competition than inno-
vation for its own sakethe Departmentof Justice and FTC have both
also expressed interest in protectinginnovation for its own sake,as the
following cases ifiustrate.
The proposed $16 billionmerger of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc into
the pharmaceuticalcompany known as Aventis raised both potential
and actual competitionconcerns for the FTC.119 Innovation was central
to the potential competition aspects ofthe merger. Hoechst hadan
existing anticlotting product andRhône-Poulenc was close behind,
with a product almost through the FDAreview process. As in Ciba!
Sandoz, the FTC was also concernedabout a combination of patent
portfolios, in this case, patents relatedto anticlotting agents. In Decem-
ber 1999, the FTC entered intoa proposed consent agreement settling
its charges that the merger would violateSection 7 of the Clayton Act.
The parties were allowed tomerge on the condition that they divest
assets relating to Rhône-Poulenc's directthrombin inhibitor drug
Revasc to preserve competition and theopportunity for innovation in
direct thrombin inhibitionas a superior treatment for blood-clot±ing
diseases. The merged entitywas also required to divest its interest ina
subsidiary that produced celluloseacetate to preserve competition in
the market for cellulose acetatethermoplastics.12°
The FTC again faced a mix of actual andinnovation-based potential
competition issues in its challenge to theAmgen/Immunex merger in
2002.121 At the timeAmgen and Immunex proposedto merge, Amgen
had the only IL-i inhibitor (which isused to treat rheumatoid arthritis)
on the U.S. market. Immunex and one other firm, Regeneron,were the
only other companies with IL-iinhibitors in U.S. clinical trials. The
FTC feared that the combinationof the Amgen and Immunexpatent
portfolios might allow the merged firmto block entry by Regeneron.
The FTC expressed concernnot only about harm to potential competi-
tion from the merger but also about thepossibility that the combina-
tion would reduce R&D competition forrelated new products. The
FTC nonetheless allowed themerger to proceed based on a consent
decree that required the licensingof certain patents to Regeneron. The150 Katz and Shelanski
FTC reached a similar result in its reviewof the Glaxo/SmithKline Bee-
cham merger in2001.122
The cases discussed so far may leavethe impression that innovation
has been salient only in megamergerswhere biffions of dollars are at
stake in the transaction and/or inparticular market sectors, notably
pharmaceuticals and defense aerospace. Butthat is not the case. As
noted in our earlier discussion ofremedies in Section IV, the Depart-
ment of Justice sued in 2001 toblock 3D's proposed $45 million acqui-
sition of DTM, alleging that thetransaction, as originally structured,
would have resulted in higher pricesand less innovation for industrial
RP systems in the UnitedStates.'23 The complaint alleged that "3D and
DTM offered the most sophisticatedsystems in the industry and com-
peted directly against each other inthe development, manufacture,
and sale of industrial rapid prototypingsystems and materials."24 The
acquisition would have combined the twolargest manufacturers of RP
systems in the United States;reduced the number of competitors in the
U.S. market for industrial RP systemsfrom three to two; and resulted
in the combined company having aU.S. market share, by revenue, of
80 percent.125 The Depai Imentof Justice settled the case through a con-
sent decree that requires 3Dand DTM to license their RP-related pa-
tents to a firm that wifi competeagainst the merged enterprise in the
U.S. market. The district court'sdecision entering the decree expressly
discussed the merger's potential impact oninnovation as well as price
competition in the market for rapidprototyping systems.'26
Taken together, the merger cases inwhich the U.S. antitrust agencies
have made innovation a central issuefall mostly into the first of the ab-
stract cases we set out in SectionII: they have involved innovation
efforts sufficiently well underwaythat one of the merging parties can
convincingly be considered a potentialcompetitor of the other. Review
of those mergers has thus fit relativelycomfortably into the existing
framework for merger policy. But at least some caseshave paid lip ser-
vice, or even purported to baseenforcement, on the preservation of
innovation for its own sake in aparticular industrial sector. In these
casesfor example, GM/ZF and3D/DTMthe agencies did not
undertake a detailed analysis of themarket structures in the relevant
industries that would be most conducive toinnovation, nor did they
examine the welfare consequencesof reduced innovation in the indus-
tries at issue. In the GM/ZF case,the Department of Justice appears
implicitly to have assumed that one largerfirm would be worse for in-
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DTM case, the consolidation from three to two major U.S. firmsraised
concerns about innovation, although those concerns were deemed to
have been allayed by the consent decree.
The cases to date therefore do not yet givea sense of how the
agencies are likely to respond to transactions that fall into thesecond
and third abstract cases that we discuss in Section II. Approachesto
cases that raise questions about which market structures wifi bemost
conducive to efficient R&D, or that raise welfare trade-offsbetween
price competition and innovation,are not as well developed as the
review of cases in which innovation matters solely throughexisting
projects' effects on potential product-market competition. Theunder-
standing in merger policy of the relationship between competitionand
innovation wifi have to be further developed, not onlyto identify
objectionable transactions but also to craft effective remedies(to date,
licensing of intellectual property rights has generally beenassumed to
cure both the reduction in R&D and the reduction in potential competi-
tion that some mergers portend).
VII.Conclusion: Towards Dynamic Merger Policy
When it comes to merger policy, innovation is tricky stuff.However,
antitrust enforcers have the tools to treat innovation inmerger analy-
sis. The cases in which the Department of Justice and the FTChave al-
ready addressed innovation demonstrate that theagencies are sensitive
to the ways that innovation can affect future competition in product
markets. The use of information about innovation tosupport objec-
tions to a merger based on potential competitionconcerns does not
require fundamental change to, or expansion of, the existingmerger-
policy framework. The harder issues formerger policy include four
kinds of problems that transactions involving innovationraise: (1) the
need to assess potential product-market competition frominnovation
efforts still far from completion, (2) the question of whethercurrent
product sales and production capabifitiesare relevant to the assess-
ment of future competition, (3) a merger's effecton innovation, and
(4) possible trade-offs between dynamic-innovation benefitsand static-
competition benefits.
The first issue is an evidentiaryone. At what point is evidence of
innovation sufficient for the agenciesor courts to determine that the in-
novator is a predictable product-market competitor? Most of thecases
to date have involved innovations that were essentially completeand152 Katz and Shelanski
undergoing trials and/or regulatory approval. But some transactions
wifi push enforcement authorities to take a more dynamic viewof po-
tential competition. The challenge for the agencies and courtsin these
cases will not involve changing theexisting merger-review framework
but instead wifi involve articulating the parametersof the factual in-
quiry from which the agencies and courts willinfer potential competi-
tion from evidence of ongoing innovation.
The second issue, whether current market shares are relevant to pre-
dicting future product-market competition, can beaddressed within
the standard conceptual framework codified by the MergerGuidelines,
and well-developed economic tools are availablefor addressing the
issue. However, a movement away from apredominant focus on mar-
ket shares and toward a more refined analysis of industryconditions
and the nature of competition would represent a dramaticchange in
the practice of merger litigation.
The remaining problems listed above are moredifficult and funda-
mental for the existing framework on both conceptual andpractical
levels. The issues of the efficient amount or timing of innovation,and
of the comparative values of competition today versusimproved prod-
ucts tomorrow, do not fit easily into theconventional merger review
framework. Antitrust agencies could decide not to address these issues
and could retain their focus instead on more conventionalproduct-
market concerns. But the impact of innovation on economicwelfare
and the impact of market structure on innovation will occurwhether
antitrust policy accounts for them or not. Hence, if the agencieschoose
this course, judgments about these impacts would bemade implicitly
and without reflection. To the extent antitrust policymakers wish to
avoid the potential costs of ignoring innovation, the questionbecomes,
How should antitrust agencies proceed in incorporatinginnovation
concerns into their mission?
The overarching lesson from our analysis is thatmerger-policy
enforcers should recognize that innovation wifi depend moreheavily
on factual inquiries specific to agiven case and less on systematic
presumptions of the kind merger policy has long applied tostatic,
product-market competition. The analysis summarized above suggests
several approaches that the agencies charged with developingand
enforcing merger policy might use to address innovationand its poten-
tial effects in the merger-review process.
First, the agencies could develop and articulate guidelinesfor draw-
ing inferences of potential product-market competitionfrom evidenceMerger Policy and Innovation
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of ongoing innovation. Doingso would extend the existing framework
to cover several situations in whichinnovation does ormany would
say should play an important role inmerger analysis.
Second, agencies might continueto expand their consideration of
mergers' effects on innovation andconsumer welfare to cases in which
the concern is with potentialR&D projects that are not alreadyunder- way. So far, the agencies have beencautious in moving beyond
concerns about potential product-marketcompetition based on well-
defined innovative efforts. Theagencies also have not made explicit
trade-offs between short-termproduct-market competition and inno-
vation. The agencies could,however, consider broadeningtheir in-
quiry to take these important effectsinto account.
Therefore, a third approach thatthe agencies mightpursue would be
to develop the expertise thatwould allow case-by-case,fact-intensive
inquiries to assess the welfareeffects and trade-offs posed bymergers
where innovation is at stake.Academic researcherscan make an
important contribution to thiseffort by conducting industry-specific
studies that providea deeper understanding of the history andcondi-
tions for innovation in differenteconomic sectors regularly at issuein
mergers. As observed in Section V,empirical research demonstrates
that industry-specific factorsplay important roles in mediatingthe re-
lationship betweenconcentration and firm size on theone hand and
the pace of innovationon the other. Additional studies of thesort we
recommend might lead to the identificationof fact patterns that allow
clearer understanding of howto treat innovation in thecontext of the
different kinds of transactionsthat come up for review.
A fourth approach would be forthe agencies to makeuse of the tools
of decision theory to deal withuncertainty, particularly withrespect
to innovation. Under currentpractice, for example, theagencies often
take an approach of consideringa two-year horizon in assessing the
effects of entry, with littleor no discounting within the horizonand
complete discounting of anything beyond.127Similarly, efficiency bene-
fits that are realized onlywith a lag are "given less weightbecause
they are less proximate andmore difficult to predict."128 Standard deci-
sion theory indicates, however,that these approachesare poor heuris-
tics for calculating expectedpayoffs in the face of uncertainty.For
example, these approachesto entry tend to underestimate theeffects
of potentially revolutionaryinnovations that havesome probability
of having large effectsover a period of several years. Theconven-
tional decision-theoreticapproach would be to estimateprobability154
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distributions for alternativepotential outcomes and then usethose
probabilities as weights in projecting anexpected net present value of
a merger's effects onconsumer welfare.'29 Morebroadly, the effects
of mergers on thnovation areuncertain and occur over time,and the
agencies and the courts have notmade full use of established decision
theory to structure their analysesof consumer-welfare effects.
In conclusion, although a coherentand effective approach to iiinova-
tion in merger policy wifibe difficult, the analysis suggeststhat the
goal is achievable.
Notes
An average of 131 other investigations wereconducted per year (United States De-
partment of Justice, Antitrust Division,Workload Statistics 1991-2002). Non-mergeranti-
trust actions include criminalprosecutions of price-fixing cartels, aswell as civil actions
against individual companies found tohave engaged in anticompetitivepractices (e.g.,
the Microsoft case).
See Federal Trade Commission,Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional BudgetJustification
(April 9, 2001), available at
pdf, p. 46-60.
Innovation considerations were raised in someearly non-merger cases. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Amer., 148 F.2d 416, 427(2d Cir. 1945) recognized the effectsof market
power on innovation,although innovation concerns did not play asignificant role in the
decision. Innovation played a morecentral role in United States v. AutomobileManufac-
turers Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617,618 (C.D. Cal. 1969), in which the courtfound that the
leading American automobile manufacturershad engaged in a conspiracy "to eliminate
competition in the research, development,manufacture and installation of motorvehicle
air pollution control equipment....in violation of Section 1 of theSherman Act (aff'd in
part and appeal dismissed in part,397 U.S. 248 [19701).
See, e.g., Economic Report of thePresident 2000, p. 35.
1999 Annual Report, Antitrust Division,United States Department of Justice, p. 5.
"Antitrust Considerations inInternational Defense Mergers," address byRobert
Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section,Antitrust Division, United StatesDepartment of Jus-
tice (May 4, 1999), p. 3.
Of course, from a long-run perspective,promoting innovation and promoting
low, quality-adjusted prices are largelythe same objective. The distinction wedraw
in the text can be viewed as onebetween static pricing efficiency anddynamic pricing
efficiency.
Admittedly, this case is somewhat artificial.Actual markets are likely to have ongoing
waves of innovation.
Under the total welfare standard, efficiencygains benefit firms and, if they arepassed
on in lower prices orhigher quality, their customers as well.Both are equally valued. See
Williamson (1968). Under the alternative consumerwelfare standard, the competition
authority takes into account only thosebenefits passed on to consumers.Merger Policy and Innovation
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See, e.g., Neven and Roller (2000).
See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement andthe Consumer, available athttp://www.usdojgov/ atr/public/divstats/9142pdf (2001), Sections1, 2, 4; Antitrust Guidelines for Collabora-
tions Among Competitorson the FTC web site (04/2000), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/
OS/2000/04/ftcdojguideljnes.pdfp. 1, 4, 6.
15 U.S.C. Section 18. Mergerscan also be challenged under Section 1 of theSherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, which bars"[e]very contract, combination in theform of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraintof trade or commerceamong the several States, or with foreign nations."
Tn addition, private challengescan be made against mergers (although theyface antitrust-injury and standing hurdles),which may be motivated byvery different consid- erations than governmental challenges.Our focus here is on public policy.
United States Department of Justiceand the Federal Trade Commission,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, rev. April 8, 1997(hereafter, Merger Guidelines).
Merger Guidelines, Section 0.1.
See, e.g., Baker (2003) and Scheffman,Coate, and Silvia (2003).
Merger Guidelines, Sections 1.0,1.5. See also FTC v.University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n. 12 (11th Cir.1991);FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d1500, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1986); FTC v. Staples, Inc.,970 F.Supp. 1066, 1081-82 (D.D.C.1997).
For the most part, economic theoryand antitrust policy have long favoredmore competition over less for the purpose oflowering prices, expanding output,and making consumers better off. There are, however, limitedexceptions to this view. For example,
certain industries in which per-unitcost declines as output increases to thepoint that it is most efficient to have justone firm producing all output in a given markethave come to be known as natural monopolies.Historically, telecommunicationsnetworks were a leading example, and public policyactually served to limit entry. Thatview has since changed. For instance, theTelecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.Sections 151 et seq, seeks to promote competitive entry.
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Ibid.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370U.S. 294 (1962).
See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, Section 1;Toys R Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7thCir. 2000).
See, e.g., Stocking and Mueller (1955,pp. 44-8).
Merger Guidelines, Section 1.0; FTCv. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (D.D.C.
2000); California v. Sutter Health Systems,130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2001).See, also, Katz and Shapiro (2003).
Merger Guidelines, Sections 1.0 and1.11.
We are assuming that the baselineprice is greater than or equal to incrementalcost.
FTC. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186F.3d 1045 (8th Cu. 1999).
Baker (1997).
Ordover and Wall (1989,pp. 20-1) [footnote omittedj.156
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See, e.g., Parker (1998).
United States v. Philadelphia NationalBank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
See Merger Guidelines, Section1.5.
See, e.g., Schxnalensee (1989).
Merger Guidelines, Section 2.0.
The Merger Guidelines describethe process as follows:
"The Agency wifi not challenge a mergerif cognizable efficiencies are of a characterand
magnitude such that the merger is not likelyto be anticompetitive in anyrelevant mar-
ket. To make the requisitedetermination, the Agency considerswhether cognizable effi-
ciencies likely would be sufficient to reversethe merger's potential to harm consumersin
the relevant market, e.g., bypreventing price increases in that market."[Section 4, inter-
nal footnote omitted.]
See, Merger Guidelines, Section 4.0.
See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2nd Cir. 1981)("While the
antitrust laws proscribe unreasonablerestraints of competition, the patent lawsreward
the inventor with a temporarymonopoly that insulates him fromcompetitive exploita-
tion of his patented art").
See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v.Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576(Fed. Cu.
1990) ("[T]he aims and objectives of patentand antitrust laws may seem, at firstglance,
wholly at odds. However, the two bodiesof law are actually complementary").
Merger Guidelines, Section 1.11("In attempting to determine objectivelythe effect of
a 'small but significantand nontransitory' increase in price, theAgency, in most con-
texts, wifi use a price increaseof five percent lasting for theforeseeable future."). Euro-
pean Cormnission,1997, Commission Notice of the Definitionof the Relevant Market for
the Purposes of Community CompetitionLaw.(http://europa.eu.int/comm/c0mPetiti01/'
antitrust/relevma_efl.htmi) ("The question tobe answered is whether the parties' cus-
tomers would switch toreadily available substitutes or tosuppliers located elsewhere
in response to an hypotheticalsmall (in the range 5%-1O%), permanentrelative price
increase in the products and areasbeing considered.").
For most mergers, pre-merger prices aretaken at the benchmark. In caseswhere pre-
merger prices reflectcoordinated behavior, some measure of acompetitive price is used
instead. Merger Guidelines, Section 1.11.
In addition to the issues in the text,Hartman et al. offer another criticismof the stan-
dard hypothetical monopolistapproach to market definition. Theircriticism, however,
appears to be based on amisunderstanding of the Merger Guidelines. Hartmanet al. write
that "During [the 1970s] a varietyof [minicomputer] systems competed onprice and
performance while exhibiting pricedifferences of several hundred percent. Strictinter-
pretation of the Merger Guidelinessuggests that such price differencesimply that the
products are in different markets."(Hartman, Teece, Mitchell, and Jorde1993, p. 323.)
The hypothetical monopolist test,however, is based on the effects ofprice changes, not
existing price differentials.
See, e.g., Pleatsikas and Teece(2001, p. 671).
For the latter reason, Pleatsikasand Teece are incorrect when they assert that"defin-
ing markets from a staticperspective when innovation is rapidwifi inevitably lead toMerger Policy and Innovation
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identification of markets that are toonarrow." (Pleatsikas and Teece 2001,p. 687. [Foot-
note citing Teece and Coleman (1998), at 826-828,omitted.])
In this regard, some tension exists betweena forward-looking approach and the
Merger Guidelines' treatment of entry, whichtends to take a limited perspective. (Merger
Guidelines, Section 3.)
And, of course, the issues that innovationraises for the definition of relevant markets
affect the resulting calculation of market shares.
Under the process described by the MergerGuidelines, "Market shares wifi be calcu-
lated using the best indicator of firms'future competitive significance." Merger Guidelines,
Section 1.41.
As discussed in Section V of thispaper, the flip side is that a merger may have
substantiaj effects on competitioneven if the post-merger market share is permissible
within the enforcement guidelines. If themerger brings together two imminent technolo-
gies that otherwise would have competed, thenconsumers lose out on rivalry that other-
wise would have come to exist absent themerger.
Merger Guidelines, Section 1.521. Theextent to which the agencies are willing to adopt
forward-looking views of competition is thesubject of some debate.
United States v. 3D Systems Corporation and DTMCorporation, Verified Complaint.
United States v. 3D Systems Corporationand DTM Corporation, Final Judgement
(Proposed).
Intellectual property assets alsowere included in the divestitures required to settle
United States v. Premdor U.S. Holdings, Inc.International Paper Company, and MasoniteCor-
poration. Similarly, United Statesv Miller Industries involved acquisitions of towtruck
companies holding important patents and ledto a connsent degree with mandatory
licensing.
For a discussion of the application of Section2 to high-technology markets, see Evans
and Schmalensee (2002).
General principles of antitrust law require"clear proof" or at least a "reasonable
probability" that entry into thenew market would in fact have occurred in thenear future and disallow speculation about"ephemeral possibifities." (United Statesv. Marine
Bancorp, 418 U.S. 602, 617, 623 (1974);Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2dCit.
1982); In re B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852,919-928 (1984).)
Gilbert and Sunshine (1995).
We will return to this point inour reviewof selected innovation cases below.
See, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz (1975,p. 20), ("concentration reflects the current
sellers of a product and may be quiteunrelated to the extent of actual and potentialri- vahy in innovating new products".) Seealso, Evans and Schmalensee (2002,pp. 16-18) and Hartman, Teece, Mitchell, and Jorde (1993,pp. 322-3).
Under the theory of limit pricing, incumbentfirms set low prices today to deter
future entry. In many circumstances,however, the threat entry wifi have little effecton pre-entry prices, and potential competition playsa relatively small role in price setting.
There are some exceptions. Even instatic settings, for instance, perfect competition
does not attain the first best in thepresence of externalities, and distortions fromconcen-
tration may in some cases offset those fromexternalities.158 Katz and Shelanski
For example, in their 1975 surveyof work on innovation and market structure,
Kamien and Schwartz stated that "Few,if any, economists maintain that perfect competi-
tion efficiently allocates resources fortechnical advance." (Kamien and Schwartz 1975,
p. 2.) Today,economists have a deeper appreciation for licensingand other forms of in-
novation diffusion, so there might be lessagreement with such a sweeping statement be-
cause multiple interpretationsof what is meant by perfect competition arepossible in this
context.
Hicks (1935, p. 8).
Schumpeter (1942, p. 106).
Of course, the competitive ideal of antitrustpolicy has evolved over time. When
Schumpeter was writing, the ideal wasrivalry among small, atomized economic actors.
Any cooperation or concentration deviatingfrom that standard was inherently suspect.
The Chicago School revolution did much toimprove understanding of why different
market structures might result in different contextsand thereby reduced rigid adherence
to the perfectly competitive model.Because of its benefits for allocative efficiency, compe-
tition nonetheless remained the touchstoneof antitrust policy.
Scherer (1992).
Fellner (1951) and Arrow (1962).
Scherer (1967), Kamien and Schwartz (1972),and Kamien and Schwartz (1976).
See Scherer (1992) and Reinganum (1989).
It should be observed that, in termsof efficiency, the social value of innovation isthe
incremental improvement that it represents overthe existing technology. Hence, the fact
that a monopolist is concerned withcannibali7ation is not entirely indicative of aneffi-
ciency problem.
See, e.g., Mansfield (1968).
Williamson (1965), Bozeman and Link (1983),and Mukhopadhyay (1985).
Scherer (1967).
Levin, Cohen, and Mowery (1985) and Scott(1984).
Cohen and Levin (1989), citing Cohen, Levin,and Mowery (1987).
See Kamien and Schwartz (1975, pp.20-22). Kamien and Schwartz summarized their
survey of the empirical literature asfollows: "In reviewing the diverse findings on re-
search efforts and concentration, we findlittle consensus" (p. 22), and "Our reviewof the
impact of market structure on innovationhas netted little more than reaffinnationof
the early observation that both competitive pressuresand market opportunity seem im-
portant." (p. 24). Somewhat surprisingly, theythen concluded their survey with "A new
empirically inspired hypothesis has emerged tothe effect that a market structure inter-
mediate between monopoly and perfectcompetition would promote the highest rate of
innovative activity." (p. 32).
In terms of theory, a recentdemonstration of this possibility is provided in a paper
by Jan Boone, which finds that an increasein the intensity of competition can drive a
leading firm to increase its innovation byrelatively more than its rivals and thus increase
future concentration. (Boone 2001.)Merger Policy and Innovation 159
Geroski (1990).
Kamien and Schwartz (1975,p. 15), attribute this general idea to Gaibraith.
For a survey, see Reinganum (1989).
Similar effects may arise when being firstto market creates a durable advantage in
terms of favorable consumer perceptions.
See, e.g., Grifiches (1992) and Jones and Williams(1998).
Carlton and Gertner (2003) point out thatempirical studies generally compare average
private arid social returns, while the privately andsocially optimal R&D levels depend
on marginal returns. In settings where R&D investment isdriven by preemption incen-
tives, the private marginal returnsmay deviate from the private average returns bymore
than the marginal social returns deviate fromthe average social returns, suggesting that
perhaps excessive private incentives would bea problem. It is far from evident, however,
that patent pre-emption incentivesare of empirical significance in many industries.
The source of the socially excessive R&Dis the fact that the innovating firm's rivals
may see their profits fall as a result of the innovation, andthe innovator does not count
this reduction in total surplus as a cost.
Merger Guidelines, Section 4.
For a general comparison of alternative institutionalarrangements, including merger,
see Katz (1995).
For an overview of the ambiguous relationshipbetween firm size and innovation, see
Cohen and Kiepper (1996).
Galbraith (1952) and Nordhaus (1969).
Kanuen and Schwartz (1982) and Cohen andLevin (1989, p. 1067).
Scherer (1965).
Cohen and Levin (1989).
Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987) and Cohenand Levin (1989).
Fisher and Temin (1973), Kohn and Scott (1982),and Acs and Audretsch (1990 and
1991).
Acs and Audretsch (1991).
See, e.g., Baker (1995).
Kamien and Schwartz (1975,p. 26).
Gugler and Siebert (2004).
In this regard, the divestiture of intellectualproperty to preserve product-market
competition (see Section 0 above), ismore similar to the manufacturing/retailingpara- digm than to the innovation paradigm.
For a discussion of antitrust policy towardsingle-firm conduct in markets character-
ized by Schumpeterian competition,see Evans and Schmalensee (2002).
Judge Posner (2000) has offereda different view of the problem. He argues that
high-tech mergers can be dealt with well byexisting institutions and policies, but that160 Katz and Shelanski
high-tech unilateral conduct cases are problematicalbecause the agencies and courts can
neither bring sufficient technical expertise to bear onthe issues nor move in a timely
enough fashion given industry's rate of change.
Roche Holdings, Ltd., FTC No. C3315 (filedNovember 18, 1990).
See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995, p. 580) for furtherdiscussion of this case.
United States v. General Motors Corp., No. 93-530 (D.Del., ified November 16, 1993).
Ibid.
Ibid.
See, e.g., Gilbert and Sunshine (1995).
See Pitofsky, et al. (1997).
Ibid at 2.







Similar issues arose and conclusions werereached in the Department of Justice's
challenge of a proposed merger of the only twocompanies that manufacture nuclear sub-
marines for the United States. (United Statesof America v. General Dynamics Corporation
and Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc.,Verified Complaint, United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, October 23, 2001.)
See In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Ltd., et al.,Decision and Order, FTC Docket No.
C-3725, March 24, 1997.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See FTC, In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Ltd, etal., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order




Hoechst AG, FTC Docket No. C-3939 (2000),available at http://www.ftc.gOV/O5/
caselist/c3919.htm See, also, Arquit and Wolfram (2001, p.453).
Hoechst AG, FTC Docket No. C-3939 (2000),available at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
c3919.htm.Merger Policy and Innovation
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Amgen Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4056 (2002),available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/c4056.htm
Glaxo Welicome PLC, FTC Docket No. C-3990(2001), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/caselist/c399o.h. See, also, Glaxo Weilcomeplc & SmithKline Beecham plc., FTC
Docket No. C-3990 (Dec. 18, 2000) (Analysisof Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/g1axoa; Arquitand Wolfram (2001,pp. 337-9).
United States v. 3D Systems Coip. and DTM Coip.,C.V. No. 1:01CV01237 (D.D.C. ified
June 6, 2001). See, at http://w.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f8800/559 (Complaint). See,
also, United States v. 3D Systems, 2002-2Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,738 (D.D.C. 2002) (Final
judgment).
United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTMCorp., Complaint, Section 21.
Ibid.
United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTMCorp., Final judgment, at 11.
Merger Guidelines, Section 3.2. The agenciessometimes take a more sophisticated
view, at least when deciding whetherto ifie a case against a proposedmerger, if not in court.
Ibid, foothote 37.
We observe in passing that thereare difflcuJt legal issues concerning whether the
courts can appropriately aggregate welfareaffects across different generations of
consumers.
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